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PREFACE

“It must be acknowledged that equality, which brings great benefits into the world,
nevertheless suggests to men some very dangerous propensities. It tends to isolate them
from one another, to concentrate every man’s attention upon himself; and it lays open the
soul to an inordinate love of material gratification.”
Alexis de Tocqueville
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From May 1831 until February of the following year, Alexis de Tocqueville
chronicled a watershed moment of human history. He had come to America, a country
bom of will and chance, whose nation had matured unmolested by the democratic
revolution that had propelled his native France into an early adolescence and spawned
unforeseen dangers of a new age. For Tocqueville, America was the germ of equality,
the inspiration for a global movement towards democratic society; under democracy,
equality of condition was quickly supplanting old paradigms of aristocratic life with such
force that, to obstruct it, Tocqueville remarked, would be to challenge the will of God
himself (1:7). Thus, it was in America where he hoped to find the keys to successful
democracy, for the ultimate fate of the new age remained unwritten. While it opened vast
new fields to progress and liberty, it also hid endemic dangers from all but the keenest
minds. Fortunately for us, Tocqueville was among the latter.
Nearly all who read it find Democracy in America (hereafter Democracy)
insightful and surprisingly prescient. Many credit Tocqueville with predicting the
American Civil War—and more notably the Cold War—as well as numerous
characterizations of democratic life that seem increasingly apropos. Yet, looming beyond
these sensational predictions, confirmed by the passage of time, is an undefined but
potentially dark end to the dream of America’s founders. For those who read him
closely, Tocqueville unfolds the hidden cancer of democratic despotism, metastasizing
incrementally as the age of equality matures. Presaging liberty’s potential demise is the
real genius of Tocqueville and the master message of Democracy. It is his most urgent,
yet most inscrutable lesson for democratic peoples.
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Tocqueville’s arresting insight has spawned countless questions; the most
pressing, perhaps, is whether democracies can avoid the Hobbsian fate towards which
they seem ineluctably drawn. I do not know, nor do I presume to understand the future of
democracy better than Tocqueville, even with the advantage of modem history. My
intuition, however, is that we cannot. Despite such pessimism, I am drawn to
Tocqueville’s message if for no other reason than to better grasp the vexing predicaments
in which America increasingly finds herself.
In the introduction to Democracy, Tocqueville offers his French readers a
metaphor for their then-current democratic condition; "placed in the middle of a rapid
stream, we obstinately fix our eyes on the ruins that may still be descried upon the shore
we have left, while the current hurries us away and drags us backward towards the abyss"
(1:7). He enjoins his audience to turn their gaze from the decaying ramparts of
aristocracy, downstream to a “new political science” to best guide successful democracy.
After centuries of progress, modem democracies are gradually approaching that abyss,
and now, ironically, it behooves us to look to the past, upon the courses we have chosen,
if we wish to navigate the cataract of despotism that may lie ahead. The wisdom of
Tocqueville and the democratic journey he charts for readers is well-suited to that
endeavor.
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ABSTRACT

THE FAMILY IN TOCQUEVILLE’S DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
Understanding Difference in the Age o f ILquality
by
Nicholas Noloboff
University of New Hampshire, May, 2007
The American family in Tocqueville’s Democracy in America presents a novel
association to humankind; at its heart are natural bonds between generations, spouses and
siblings that offer, through public recognition, new opportunities for both individual and
civic improvement. Through an exposition of Democracy’s American family, this paper
addresses how the association helps remediate the greatest dangers of the age of equality:
a tyrannical majority, materialism, individualism and ultimately, democratic despotism.
It finds that the chief virtue of the American family comes from the natural,
complementary gender differences that define marriage in American public opinion; in
particular, the social recognition that American wives receive supports a level of
morality—and political success—that is singular to the Americans and integral to the
maintenance of democracy, generally.
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CHAPTER I

THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN THE LITERATURE

The insights that Tocqueville brings to the subject of democracy have spawned
generations of scholarship, from empirical assessments of his observations to modem
rewrites of his original journey.1 Across this spectrum, scholars acknowledge that
Tocqueville saw American democracy in mixed hues; some find his observations sunnier
than others, but none suggest his vision was entirely rosy. Since all agree he saw a dark
side to democracy—namely the danger of despotism, but also particular worries like
materialism—many wonder what securities protect it.
Perhaps the clearest strength of American democracy is its religious foundation,
separate from the sphere of political life but instructing its morality so well that
Tocqueville named it “the first of America’s political institutions”( l : 316). While
Americans’ commercial, intellectual and political lives are molded by an odd pairing of
skepticism and innovation, religious dogma is entrenched in their moral constitution.
Tocqueville observed that they share universal notions of Christian morality which not
only define the boundaries of proper conduct but restrict the purview of doubt. Thus,
while Tocqueville’s Americans did not use religion to justify political authority (e.g.
divine right of kings, etc.), religion still instructed politics by rendering certain ideas and
acts unquestionable. In Tocqueville’s words, “religion exercises but little influence upon

' Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone and Bemard-Henri Levy’s recent American Vertigo are examples,
respectively.
2 Hereafter, all references are to Democracy in America (Bradley Ed.) Knopf 1945, unless otherwise noted.
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the laws and upon the details of public opinion; but it directs the customs of the
community and, by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state” (1:314-15).
A less appreciated, but clearly connected antidote to the dangers of democracy is
the democratic family, an ubiquitous institution so peculiar to the American experience
that Tocqueville proclaimed “[i]n America, the family, in the Roman and aristocratic
signification of the word, does not exist” (2: 202). At the heart of the democratic family
was a “natural bond” between its members, a quality of enhanced sympathy and affection
unknown in aristocratic times when social hierarchies dictated the formal tenor of
relations. Allan Bloom writes, “Nature here is understood as the first movements of the
heart unaffected by conventions, which are the source of corruption” (242).
The literature reviewed in this chapter offers nuanced presentations of the
American family as it bears on democracy. Notable differences do emerge, yet overall
this rather limited group of scholars interprets Tocqueville’s meta-message similarly,
even if they debate its relevance and details. Specifically, most recognize that
Tocqueville saw a pernicious tendency for equality to lead democrats into private,
individualistic spheres that discouraged civic engagement. Further, they agree that
Tocqueville viewed this habit as slowly suicidal to free societies; the family’s role in this
process, however, is less clear. Does the natural family that emerges from the same state
of equality somehow offset these dangers? To this point Tocqueville writes, “I do not
know, on the whole, whether society loses by the change [from families built upon
conventional paternal authority to those secured by natural sympathies], but I am inclined
to believe that man individually is a gainer by it” (2: 205). Clearly, the question is worth
pursuing.
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A handful of scholars address Democracy’s American family exclusively, while
many cite it briefly when discussing other aspects of the book. Of those whose primary
focus it is, their scholarship illuminates a few key areas including: the accuracy of
Tocqueville’s portrayal of domestic life; his faith in the American family as a guardian of
liberty; and the relations of the family, with particular focus on the inequality of husband
and wife. Here, the debate has focused on the origin, and relative justice, of a
conspicuous gender hierarchy that Tocqueville found important for democratic liberty. A
few scholars apply Tocqueville’s conclusions to democracy today, using him as their
scapegoat—or their hero—as they rejoice and lament America’s changing mores.
Roger Boesche’s Why Did Tocqueville Fear Abundance? interprets Tocqueville
in a way that most authors share, notably by focusing on his fear of democratic
materialism. Boesch argues that Bourgeoisie society, the inevitable product of
democracy, holds acquisitiveness at its defining ethic (27). Such a principle threatens
democracy by sapping men of the time and energy for anything but private pursuits and
by distracting their attention from civic life (Boesch 28-9). On Tocqueville’s view,
commercial man lacks the time and the inclination to be political, a dangerous prospect
for a politics of self-government. Boesch, as well as Alice Behnegar, recognizes a
distinction between types of freedom that highlights this danger. Quoting Tocqueville,
Boesch writes (31) “So wrong it is to confound independence with liberty. No one is less
independent than a citizen of a free state.” Unfortunately, as democrats prioritize
commerce, they foster habits of self-interest and private independence, not the conscious
discipline needed by a free society.3
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The view that Tocqueville feared abundance is generally held throughout the
literature as is the belief that he saw family as somehow mitigating the threat of
individualism. Boesch argues that family, along with five other elements that have roots
in the aristocratic age (i.e. community, religion, love of future, mores and laws, work
ethic), works to restrain self-interest, yet the precise means whereby this happens is
unclear (33). Boesch suggests that this mechanism, so to speak, is the natural bonds of
the democratic family which increase affection between its members as their ties to
society attenuate (34).
Like Boesch, F.L. Morton notes Tocqueville’s fear of individualism and asserts
that while religion and enlightened self-interest are widely noticed by scholars, the family
is often overlooked as an equally relevant antidote to individualism (309). In Sexual
Equality in the Family in Tocqueville’s “Democracy in America ” Morton qualifies
Boesch’s nod to natural bonds as the family’s key virtue, citing the character of the
conjugal union, specifically, as a more accurate basis for Tocqueville’s praise for the
American family.
In highlighting the family’s importance to Tocqueville, Morton sums up its
influence thus: “He [Tocqueville] argues that the experience of the family

draws the

individual out of his preoccupation with himself and induces a concern for others” (310).
The basis for such concern is the couple’s 'different-but-equal' status which contradicts
intuitive notions of democratic equality. Along with Morton, William Mathie observes
that as relative equality replaced the hierarchy of aristocratic families, it reduced the

3 Commercial success is so esteemed by Americans, that Tocqueville recognizes it as the sole repository of
honor in America; precisely because it is viewed as necessary for the nation’s material success, mercantile
courage has replaced military valor as the path to American glory (2: 249-50).
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moral authority of the father and removed his guaranteed inheritance, leaving men more
dependent (and more focused) on work; necessity superseded virtue as the object of
men’s attention (317).4 But as equality lowered male morality—or at least its priority—it
raised women substantially above their aristocratic forbears. They become so significant
to liberty that Tocqueville attributes America’s success chiefly “to the superiority of its
women” (2:319).
The nature of this “superiority” is a key component of the natural family and is
often raised by scholars. Most contend that the superiority of which Tocqueville speaks
regards morality; some also include intellect (e.g. William Kristol). More importantly,
scholars also question whether the assertion compares American to European women, the
sexes within America, or both. Morton’s interpretation of Tocqueville’s claim as the
second option is most characteristic of the literature overall. Where this moral superiority
originates, however, is less clear. Morton, for example, claims that Tocqueville sees the
basis for difference in nature but admits that education is a crucial part of sustaining
female morality (324). If it is based in nature, he notes, one may ask whether women
should become more public if their potential to redeem politics is so great (319).5
The sexes different-but-equal status is valued by Tocqueville principally for its
political utility, regardless of the origin of female superiority, argue many scholars;
specifically, transporting women from the domestic to the public domain would engender
a competition between the sexes that mirrored the larger commercial competition within

4 Insofar as aristocratic mores relied on the "wisdom of...ancestors", democracy's tendency to disregard
tradition contributed to the loss o f patriarchal moral authority, argues Mathie (12).
5 Additionally, an interpretation o f gender-based female moral superiority also raises the question of
whether aristocracies founded on paternalistic values are necessarily inferior to democracies maintained by
female virtue.
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society, thereby undermining familial duties based on the different-but-equal ethos
(Morton 322). Behnegar recognizes that democratic duties are, in fact, based on needs
that emerge from marriages that “exaggerate if not create” gender differentiation (346).6
Thus, in gaining more direct access to politics, women would lose the very quality
(influence) that could make such access beneficial; most agree that Tocqueville prefers
that women remain cloistered at home and have a stronger, if less direct influence on
politics through the moral instruction of husbands and sons.
For women to instruct men in morals, they must be well suited to the task. As
mentioned, some interpret Tocqueville’s faith in female virtue to be based on natural
differences between the sexes, but as Morton notes, even Tocqueville believes that
relying on nature exclusively, is insufficient (323). Scholars also recognize Tocqueville’s
praise for women’s education in America—more open and worldly than that of France—
which relied on reason and education to protect female morality.
In early New England, women's moral education drew on various components of
American society of which religion and the principle of enlightened self-interest were
foremost. Mathie, and Sanford Kessler argue that female morality was first instructed by
the austere mores of the Puritans, but by Tocqueville's time its influence was owed
elsewhere (Mathie 20). Kessler argues that enlightened self-interest became Americans’
attempt to reasonably show how self-interest and public good were synonymous and, in
so doing, gave democratic women a basis for moral behavior more convincing than

6 Most scholars, Morton and Mathie included, see natural bonds in other family relations (i.e. between
father and son and between siblings) as less separate and more equal. Consequently, these relations do not
support the idea o f duties to others, but rather foster a kind o f sympathy that characterizes the “natural
bond” which between husband and wife allows for a union based on love, but not a marriage based on
equality.
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religion (254). He writes “Their [Americans] first accomplishment was to institute a
system of education which made enlightened self-love rather than religion the primary
basis of chastity. This reform became necessary when interest replaced piety as the
driving force behind most Americans’ behavior” (258).
At home, William Kristol contends that women employ enlightened self-interest
by subordinating themselves to men in marriage and upholding female chastity. In
return, they gain the material support needed to raise children and advance society in the
process (491). Alice Behnegar claims that by accepting marital inequality, American
women “sacrifice ...immediate sensual gratification and...absolute liberty and equality to
a long-term, rational interest in “social existence”, in tranquility and in such happiness as
her situation allows” (347). This truncated happiness—the final end to which she
sacrifices her equality—hints at yet another force instructing female morality, American
public opinion.
Tocqueville’s views on American public opinion are hard to miss. Throughout
Democracy, he refers to its overwhelming power on democrats, influencing everything
from doubt to dissent. One of his most famous sections—the “tyranny of the majority”—
is devoted to this topic. With respect to morality, Tocqueville praises public opinion as
central to its success. His views have not passed unnoticed. Kristol argues that while
women employ reason to help decide when and whom to marry, they are also guided by
certain “leading ideas” that clarify “the kind of democratic equality that can be
established between men and women” (483). Specifically, public opinion supports
educated women’s free choice of husbands—a luxury denied aristocratic brides—but it
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circumscribes female passion to the realm of partner selection only, excluding the baser
indulgences which in men, it tolerates.
Kessler contends that public opinion brought a dual force to bear on the moral
consciences of Americans. Its ubiquity came from America’s pervasive Christianity, but
its real strength is owed to the country’s commercial disposition (Kessler 255). He
writes, “Americans honored chastity most because it fostered commercial habits, kept
families productive, and helped maintain the political stability essential for prosperity”
(255). Mathie notes that despite his praise, Tocqueville viewed American public opinion
as exceptionally strict; after all, it codified its aversion to sexual license with laws that
treated rape as a capital offense (Mathie 16). Mathie agrees with Kessler on the religious
and commercial basis for public opinion but adds “what justifies this [conjugal morality],
for Tocqueville at least, is not that it is natural or that it serves commerce, but that it
preserves liberty in democracy” (29).
These authors argue that insofar as strongly moral women are commercially and
politically expedient, Tocqueville felt that society reinforced this disposition through a
public that censures, and may even kill transgressors. Such values loomed before
educated women, who could see the personal interests that a secure marriage served (e.g.
childrearing) as well as the social repercussions that followed impropriety. In sum,
Americans’ regimen of religion and enlightened self-interest, augmented by public
opinion, generated a political culture that supported women's natural moral superiority.
Yet, even if Americans managed to sustain female virtue, how was morality taught to
men? Not surprisingly, through sex, argues Allan Bloom (237).
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In The Relation o f the Sexes: Rousseauan Reflections on the Crisis o f Our Times,
Bloom interprets Tocqueville vis-a-vis his intellectual predecessor Rousseau and applies
Tocqueville’s observations to contemporary America where they have acquired new
meaning. Bloom argues that Tocqueville saw in the American family the proper
manifestation of male sexual desire advanced in Rousseau’s novel Emile (238). Through
conjugal sex, men transform their passions into an end that transcends self-interest in a
way that the desire for self-preservation, manifest in commercial life, cannot; sex in
marriage produces children (and mothers) whom democratic men come to love in ways
inconceivable in business relations (235).
Furthermore, argues Bloom, wives management of sex within marriage, dictates
the moral tenor of society. He writes, “What a man must do in order to get sexual
satisfaction is central to his conduct and his opinions

And men’s respect for others and

for themselves is in large measure fixed by their sentiments in this primary relationship”
(239). Insofar as men’s susceptibility to instruction presupposes a libido unmatched in
women, Bloom finds natural differences central to Tocqueville’s views on female
superiority and to the overall design of civic morality. Not surprisingly, the blurring of
gender roles under contemporary egalitarianism, he feels, would be rejected by
Tocqueville despite evidence of free choice and reason—qualities he applauds in
democratic women. Bloom writes, “The free choice of one marriage has not prevented
the demand for the free choice of others. The reason of women has not been persuaded
that dedication to the family is their natural lot, or that chastity is a compelling maxim of
prudence” (244).
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Like Bloom, most scholars imagine little tolerance for current gender equality in
the mind of Tocqueville. “My hunch is that he would have thought that we had pretty
much derailed ourselves,” writes Jean Elshtain (162). Still, Tocqueville’s relevance to
contemporary America is a final and contentious issue within the literature. Despite his
appreciation for women’s education, reason, and free choice, he nevertheless seems
strongly opposed to modem liberal egalitarianism—specifically, women functioning as
men with concomitant rights and duties, which begs the question: Are Tocqueville’s
views on morality still defensible or have they become relics of an age unrecognizable to
modem society and thus inappropriate for its instruction?
For America today, Kessler questions Tocqueville’s predictive relevance on
grounds that serious oversights existed in his initial optimism of American morality.
Kessler’s first criticism—Tocqueville’s belief that the “democratic forces which liberated
American women [education, reason, choice]... .could be confined within their
established limits” (1989, 259)—is exemplified by Bloom’s observation of the modem
penchant for remarriage. Certainly, Tocqueville must not have imagined that women’s
early freedom to choose a husband would extend so far as this. Additionally, says
Kessler, unseen changes in science (i.e. technological advances and birth control) made
gender differentiation less critical to the economy, thereby endangering enlightened selfinterest, Tocqueville’s favored principle that squared chastity and female domesticity
with progress; moreover, “the old equation of sexual morality and national economic
prosperity.. .no longer holds as the sexual revolution now fuels a significant part of the
American economy” (Kessler 1989, 261). Clearly, America changed in ways
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inconceivable to Tocqueville, yet scholars still find relevance in his mores, at times with
slightly modified justifications.
Like Kessler, Dorothea Wolfson recognizes that the commercial basis for gender
differentiation no longer applies, but nevertheless rejects this change as a mandate for
pure gender equality. “In his [Tocqueville] day it was the needs of a growing commercial
economy that helped keep women in the role of primary care-giver. In our own day, it is
only a cultivated awareness that there is something higher than democratic justice that
will do so” (Wolfson 207). That “something higher” is human liberty, according to Alice
Behnegar.
If Tocqueville accepts the natural moral superiority of American women as well
as a subordinate social position whereby they instruct male behavior, he must support a
kind of egalitarian inequality. This is possible, argues Behnegar, because “Tocqueville’s
real interest is not the difference or inequality between the sexes, but in human greatness
or dignity” (Behnegar 347). For Tocqueville, that dignity is personified by women’s
recognition that subordination serves her family’s interests (as well as her own), and by
the fact that her commitment to something larger than herself comes despite an
immediate loss of freedoms. In doing so, American women not only foster but, in fact
constitute, the kind of human liberty that Tocqueville was after (Behnegar 350).
Behnegar writes, “Human liberty means that one is in thrall neither to oneself (to one’s
passions or interests) nor to others (politically or intellectually). It requires self-sacrifice
and principled self-assertion, and equality undermines both” (355). Thus, calls by
feminists for pure gender equality remain untenable to Wolfson and Behnegar, despite
the loss of commerce as an excuse for female subordination. To them, there remains a
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higher purpose that this subordination serves—namely, human dignity—and insofar as
this dignity recognizes innate gender differences, its priority remains unchanged by
conventions.
In Women, Equality and the Family, Jean Elshtain does not go so far as to commit
women indefinitely to a purely domestic life, but she does recognize the growing
dissolution of society and questions whether symmetrical gender roles—the aim of
egalitarian feminism—are tenable. Elshtain accurately observes that while women have
happily gone forth from the domestic sphere into business and politics, men have not, nor
do they seem inclined to return home (162). Consequently, no one remains to give moral
instruction to children; responding to the consequences of that void will be the state
(Elshtain 163). Not surprisingly, William Kristol surpasses Elshtain in his critique of
egalitarian feminism, arguing that even mild gender equality invites the democratic
despotism feared by Tocqueville. Interestingly, Kristol’s argument here relies as much
on men’s innate aggression and stubbornness as it does women’s moral facility. While
he shares the accepted view that female morality is expedient to democracy, he also
asserts that “male intractability.. .underlies the love of independence” which is key to
preventing the kind of despotism that Tocqueville feared and is compromised by mores
that tolerate sexual equality (485). To adequately protect liberty, men must retain their
intransigence while staying open to moral instruction by women, possible only if
Americans recognize the need for strong morals and marriages based on inequality (491);
on Kristol’s view, any move toward egalitarianism appears to endanger liberty.
Quite the contrary, argues Lama Janara in Democracy’s Family Values: Alexis de
Tocqueville on Anxiety, Fear and Desire. Although she interprets Tocqueville’s
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observations of the family similarly to others, she does not share their faith in hierarchy’s
importance to liberty. Janara’s argues that both Tocqueville and Americans have an
acute fear of democratic chaos which they projected most forcibly onto American girls
(567). Absent the distinct stations and predictable duties of aristocracy, Americans seek
to reinvent order where equality has excised it from society. Instead of class hierarchies,
“they lean on gender relations for ordering democracy” (Janara 560). But female
subordination gives men a false—and dangerous—sense of security. Janara believes that
by controlling women through education, domestic confinement and public opinion,
American men assume that they have somehow “escaped the subjugation they would
likely have endured under aristocracy” only to make themselves less vigilant of
democratic despotism (Janara 578). Consequently, conjugal inequality undermines
rather than protects the free state. On this point, Janara stands in particular opposition to
Kristol.
What exactly Tocqueville’s conservative mores offer Americans today really is
open to speculation. While none can causally link gender equality and moral decay, the
decline of the strictly domestic female and the rapid disintegration of the natural family in
the latter half of the 20th century (e.g. divorce, single parenthood, alienated youths, etc.)
are very real. Yet even i f empirics supported a connection between absent mothers,
delinquency and moral incontinence, very prickly questions of justice and responsibility
must be addressed in any serious proposal to re-segregate the sexes. Despite Kristol’s

7 Janara argues that the subjugation o f women supplements existing racial and economic hierarchies that
also serve to calm Americans’ fears o f social chaos, but which also stand in contrast to the democratic
impulse for equality (577).
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pragmatic and Behnegar’s principled justifications for marital inequality8, it remains to be
shown that justice can indeed exist in such an arrangement. If free choice justifies
marital inequality, the force of public opinion makes women’s consent to such conditions
suspect. Additionally, does a natural basis for such inequality necessarily justify
restricting women to the family, even if it is expedient? Of course, if justice is achieved
by fulfilling one’s natural aptitude, as Plato suggests, then democracies are justified,
maybe even obliged, to return women to the home, granted Tocqueville’s accuracy on
innate female morality. To modem notions of justice however, why women bear
responsibility for morality remains glaringly unanswered. In a liberal democracy, does
men’s lack of interest in domestic life justify their absence there? No more, it would
seem, than women’s under conditions of equality and consent. These remain
confounding, though vital questions for understanding democratic health but exceed the
scope of my project, which aims to interpret rather than apply Tocqueville’s position on
the American family.
By and large, the literature reviewed here offers a fairly coherent interpretation of
Tocqueville’s rendering of the family, particularly as it bears on democracy. This
understanding holds complimentary gender relations central to women’s ability to
influence civic life by moralizing husbands and sons. It relies on a view of female
morality that Tocqueville saw as natural but which must be protected by education and
buttressed by a moralistic public opinion. To scholars, it is clear that Tocqueville thought
the family helped preserve liberty, but Tocqueville is less explicit. He does say this: “I
do not know, on the whole, whether society loses by the change [from families built upon

8 These are: women have more to gain from marriage than men, and, married women exemplify human
dignity, respectively.
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paternal authority to those secured by natural sympathies], but I am inclined to believe
that man individually is a gainer by it” (2: 205). This assertion leaves unanswered the
precise nature of the family’s contribution to democratic health. It is this omission that
guides the present research.
In Democracy Tocqueville aims to understand how equality has changed the
family. By considering these changes in light of democracy’s chief dangers, my research
considers the converse. It does not seek to empirically confirm or refute the domestic
scene of which Tocqueville writes, nor his predictions; its purpose is to re-examine what
Tocqueville says—and doesn’t say—about equality’s effect on the family and show what
these changes may have in store for democratic society. Leading this effort will be the
following research question: In what ways does the American family, as viewed by
Tocqueville in Democracy in America, remediate the worst dangers o f democratic
equality? Hopefully, this query will add insight to an understudied aspect of
Tocqueville’s message so that readers may draw more informed lessons on democracy
from the author’s wisdom.
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CHAPTER II

DEMOCRACY'S AMERICAN FAMILY: AN INTERPRETATION

Two Nations Under God
It is not hard to imagine why the family is an instructive if not somewhat distant
portal from which to descry political life; the two have been an inseparable pair since
ancient times.9 Historically, family served as an extension of political administration
whereby fathers functioned as intermediaries between dependent citizens and the state.
In America, the institution makes a strong, and I believe central, appearance in the
earliest formation of the nation. A close reading of Democracy reveals the primacy of
family to the overall health of democratic life; it is this association wherein children leam
mores that begin their political socialization, and spouses reciprocate duties that define
the character, and the limits of their public and private lives. It is unsurprising then, that
Tocqueville remarks on the family throughout Democracy—most obviously in his
chapter addressing equality’s novel effects on the association—despite his silence on the
reciprocal effects that changes to family have on society. Regardless of this omission,
family may be the very best place to begin to understand political life, given
Tocqueville’s view of the explanatory power of origins, and the role family played in the
nation’s formation.
In the early chapters of Democracy, Tocqueville introduces his readers to the
Americans by way of analogy. He remarks that if one truly wants to know the human

9 The family in Aristotle’s Politics is a good example of the attention paid to this connection in antiquity.
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soul, one must necessarily survey the formative infancy that has shaped the man before
us (1:28); so too is the case with nations. Regarding the importance of origins,
Tocqueville’s historical method places special (but not exclusive) emphasis on the
circumstances of America’s birth.10 The passions and predilections of her first
immigrants; their humors and handicaps; their reception in the new world; even the
conflicts that drove them from the European main, must all be reconciled in any fair
account of the 19th century nation. In America’s case, these generative factors were
notably peculiar, for she became two nations, divided at birth.
Conceived from a similar paternity but nurtured by a different mothering hand,
two foundings grew into starkly different, almost contrary peoples, divided by purpose
and constitution. By Tocqueville’s day, the two remained estranged, raising cousins of a
common, but distant ancestry that grew obscured with time. Though unsure of the
outcome, Tocqueville knew that such a protracted division was unsustainable; America
would one day demand a unified, or dominant, heritage. The historic fratricide that
proved Tocqueville’s fears solved the question of America’s cultural bloodline.
Interestingly, early in Democracy, Tocqueville accurately presages the infirmity that
would accompany this death.
The nations mentioned above are America’s first colonies of Virginia and
Massachusetts, respectively. They shared a common English heritage but retained
definitive differences that their peoples carried with them to the New World. With
respect to the colonies’ chief objectives, as well as their inhabitants, these differences
were stark.

10 A nation’s fate, Tocqueville argues, is a product both o f historical circumstance and human will, despite
that democrats tend to emphasize the former at the expense o f the latter (2:91).
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Tocqueville asserts that colonies, generally, are foremost places of exile and
adventure, where misconduct or misfortune leads men by necessity (2:32). On these
counts, Virginia was unexceptionable. Carved from a leading passion of the time, the
promise of gold brought scores of mercenaries and misfits to the Virginia coast in search
of instant fortune (1:31). “No lofty views, no spiritual conception, presided over the
foundation of these new settlements,” writes Tocqueville (2:31). To the British, Virginia
was the earliest Wild West and as such, it attracted a certain brand of pioneer whose
swashbuckling entrepreneurial legacy, though self-destructive, managed to survive in
spirit if not in practice. Oddly, Virginia had the greater success of its prudent rival to the
north—the Massachusetts colony—to thank for this.
Though Tocqueville admits that America takes her commercial habits from
Virginia, the balance of her culture comes from Puritan roots. In contrast to the
mercenary ends of the Virginia founding, Massachusetts was settled for the “triumph of
an idea,” namely religious freedom (1:33). This key difference helped ensure the
colony’s early survival by unifying thought and action toward a shared purpose; its
ultimate success, however, was a matter of demographics. “The other colonies,” writes
Tocqueville, “had been founded by adventurers without families; the immigrants of New
England brought with them the best elements of order and morality; they landed on the
desert coast accompanied by their wives and children” (1:33). Thus, while the first
difference between the colonies resided in their ends—fortune in Virginia’s case, liberty
in Massachusetts’—it was the divergent peoples who pursued these dreams (i.e. bands of
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men versus ordered families, respectively) who proved definitive to New England’s
cultural survival.11
To be clear, the Puritans’ ideological victory was enabled not by gender
diversity per se, but by habits that only families could foster. It is questionable whether a
New England colony demographically alike Virginia could have survived despite the
piety of its founding fathers, for on Tocqueville’s view, women form a singular
connection to morality that eludes even the most devoted bachelors. In concert with
men in families, women offered the best medium for a successful transfer of religious
mores to society through the moral education of children. “[Religion] directs the customs
of the community, and, by regulating domestic life, it regulates the state,” writes
Tocqueville (1:315). This connection was exemplified by the early laws of New
England, which aimed to preserve female virtue, in particular, among community morals
generally.
Citing the Connecticut Code of 1650, Tocqueville highlights the severity with
which early Americans proscribed license; along with blasphemy, adultery and rape were
capital crimes while premarital sex was subdued, when not by marriage, with fines and
whippings—punishments similar to those for idleness, drunkenness and lying (1:39-40).
Despite these strong constraints on moral behavior, political laws ensured a surprising
field of positive freedoms including: education, self-government, trial by jury and

11 That Massachusetts survived Virginia ideologically did not mean the latter’s complete demise. In fact,
Massachusetts became a surrogate for Virginia’s commercial instincts. As New England values secured a
future for the American nation, the whole o f her cultural genome accompanied this survival; the traits o f
Southern commerce passed silently to each generation o f Americans.
12 He writes “Religion is often unable to restrain man from the numberless temptations which chance
offers; nor can it check that passion for gain which everything contributes to arouse; but its influence over
the mind o f woman is supreme, and women are the protectors o f morals” (1:315).
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publicly accountable leaders, among other franchises (1:41,43). This combination of
moral discipline and political liberty was not coincidental; the Puritans did not simply
chance upon the key to political freedom by virtue of the piety of their social experiment.
Their understanding of religion’s role in freedom was advanced, and it was for political
exigencies as much as for spiritual aesthetics that they pursued the stringency of their
governing laws.13
From his perspective on the state of affairs in 1831, Tocqueville admired the
political acumen with which the Puritans codified their moral precepts. He writes,
“Nothing can be more curious or more instructive than the legislation of that period (early
17th century); it is there that the solution o f the great social problem which the United
States now presents to the world is to be found [italics added]”(l :38). What he means by
this “great social problem” is unclear; however, considering the diagnostic aim of his
treatise, this problem is likely the paradox of liberal democracy: as freedom ripens under
equality, democrats acquire certain habits that soon reach a point of diminishing returns.14
At this point appear two discrete, yet unequal choices for the retention of liberty. Under
the first, man can impose moral self-discipline in return for both political liberty and the
modest material, intellectual and spiritual freedoms afforded by public tranquility. Less
appealing to Tocqueville, his habits of excess may necessitate submission to an external
authority who curtails the former liberty to preserve a modicum of the latter.15 The
Puritan “solution”—which Tocqueville praises—follows the former path; through a

13 The best example o f this view is a passage from a speech by John Winthrop, stressing the importance o f
subjection to religious authority in pursuit o f political, or in Winthrop’s view, moral liberty (1:45).
14 The most prominent o f these dangers are treated vis-i-vis the family in Chapters III, IV and V.
15 At the risk o f oversimplification, one may consider here the state in Hobbes’s Leviathan in which men
abjure the right to self-government in exchange for a public tranquility conducive to the pursuit o f property.
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shared commitment to religious morality, made relevant by the presence of families and
secured by strict punitive laws, the Puritans achieved political self-rule accompanied by
certain private freedoms. In this way, communities of New England families sustained
the kind of free society that Virginia’s all-male colony simply could not. Moreover, they
won the cultural spoils of an early conflict between avarice and discipline and from their
values built the fledgling republic. Family was thus America’s first savior and should be
given close attention when studying Democracy’s Puritans. Whether family remained so
consequential by Tocqueville’s time is another question. The answer lies in how well the
changes to family met the concomitant challenges of American society as it grew out of
Puritan New England.
The Natural Family

It is difficult to compare the republic of Tocqueville’s time with the textbook
renditions from which he takes his views on colonial life.16 Since two-hundred years of
change divides them, modem readers must not conflate the colonial family and the
Jacksonian families of 1831; simply sharing the past does not make them coeval.
Although Tocqueville found Puritan mores in the families he came to know, a radical
*17
transformation underway in America made their birthrights of order and piety uncertain.
•

At the time he wrote, equality’s effect on family was kept to reasonable limits, yet
Tocqueville feared that if extended, radical equality could undermine the same
characteristics of family that made it one of America’s strongest defenders of liberty.

16 The source named in this particular reference is Hutchinson’s History (1:38, 39).
17 In Tocqueville’s Puritans: Christianity and the American Founding, Sanford Kessler argues that the basis
for what appeared to be 19th century Puritan chastity was in fact secular, not religious (780).
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Tocqueville suggests that a true account of the family begins with the social and
political conditions of life under which Jacksonian Americans live. These conditions
have a formative effect on their thoughts, actions and sentiments, which in turn shape the
character of democratic institutions (2:207). With this observation, Tocqueville begins
his major consideration of family life in Democracy, his chapter examining the respective
effects of hierarchy and equality on family relations. Since the chief aim of this paper is
to examine the converse—how the family reciprocates an influence on the overall health
of democratic society—an accurate rendering of this institution is key.
On Tocqueville’s view, the greatest change to family in the democratic age
concerns paternal authority. In aristocratic times, the father’s mandate was both political
and natural, as the authoritative weight of wisdom, age and experience augmented his
position as an intermediary between his dependents and the state (2:204); nobles relied on
him to ensure obedience and loyalty from his own family and from the underclass he
oversaw. The effect was a father figure “listened to with deference, addressed with
respect” and loved not without a modicum of fear (2:204). However, as aristocracy gave
way to the democratic age, the family is altered by new conditions of life. Tocqueville
mentions three that affect the waning of paternal authority.
The first concerns the overall force of equality of conditions, the reigning ethos of
the age. Tocqueville writes, “There are certain great social principles that a people either
introduces everywhere or tolerates nowhere” (2:203). Despite Americans’ ardent love of
freedom, when at odds with equality, even freedom is sacrificed to the latter, more
singular characteristic of democratic times; “they call for equality in freedom; and if they
cannot obtain that, they still call for equality in slavery,” he observes (1:102).
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Paradoxically, the primacy that Americans give to equality preserves the danger of
tyranny in the future of democratic society.

1

ft

Indeed, Tocqueville’s greatest fear, the

democratic despot lording over a citizenry equal foremost in their subservience, stems
from an excessive love of equality.19 Not surprisingly, the ubiquity of shared experiences
under equality renders “the general notion of a superior...weaker and less distinct”
(2:204). As this perspective extends into the family, it challenges the mandate of paternal
authority.
Following the overall deepening of equality throughout American life, a second
major change enervating paternal rule comes from equality’s particular effect on the
•

intellect.

90

As the general aversion to authority begins to affect the domain of thought,

intellectual authority (i.e. Truth) becomes exclusively that knowledge attained by the
“individual effort of [each man’s] understanding” (2:4).

91

While there is a brief period

during which children rely on parental knowledge, independence and experience quickly
supplant tradition as accepted means of education. Consequently, adolescent children
become their parents’ equals and assume the dispositions proper to such a relationship.

18 In a passage evocative o f Hobbes’s Leviathan, Tocqueville writes “A kind o f equality may even be
established in the political world though there should be no political freedom there. A man may be the
equal o f all his countrymen save one, who is master o f all without distinction and who selects equally from
among them all the agents o f his power” (2:100).
19 The tension and complexity o f equality’s relationship to liberty is far too great to be adequately treated
here. Suffice it to say that this relationship should not be forgotten when reading Tocqeville’s often
circumspect opinion on equality’s effect on American life.
20 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see Chapter III.
21 An interesting issue that emerges from this observation is whether democratic wisdom can ever reach the
potential heights o f that in ancient, less skeptical ages; under the democratic paradigm o f discovering truth,
man is necessarily limited by his intellectual abilities which, of course, vary widely from person to person.
Since within democracies, the only other intellectual authority besides one’s self is public opinion—an
aggregate o f individual opinions—there appears to be a dumbing down o f truth, as all are disinclined to
accept the wisdom o f another, no matter his intellectual superiority.
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From this position, ancestral norms, among other forms of knowledge, are seen “as
useless and inconvenient veils placed between them and the truth” (2:5). Thus, adding to
the general aversion to superiority under conditions of equality are independent habits of
mind which devalue tradition and, consequently, weaken the role of fathers as couriers of
ancestral norms (2:205).
Paternal authority is finally compromised by the third (and on Tocqueville’s view,
greatest) precipitant of egalitarianism—-the division of landed property. While estates
were transferred for centuries down aristocratic family lines, property is routinely divided
under each generation of democrats. As children inherit increasingly smaller parcels of
land, multi-generational families cohabitate by necessity, with greater frequency (2:205).
In doing so, they share circumstances and sympathies that make sharp divisions of
authority out of place and impractical (2:205). The net effect of these changes is a
removal of the conventions that united aristocratic kin, replaced by novel opportunities
for affection and intimacy between, and within, generations, based on shared
00

experience. The sum result is a preponderance of the democratic or, so-called natural,
family.
In the chapter outlined above, Tocqueville details the changes that precipitate a
decline in paternal authority as aristocratic paradigms of family succumb to growing
equality of conditions. Yet throughout Democracy, he never explicitly compares the
families of 1831—Jacksonian families—to those of Puritan times. Since he finds the key
to free societies in America’s colonial past (recall Tocqueville’s italicized quote on page

22 For reasons similar to those previously mentioned, a transformation paralleling that between fathers and
sons occurs between siblings. Whereas aristocratic brothers are tied by interests but divided by order of
birth, democratic siblings have a natural affinity for each other despite sometimes idiosyncratic personal
interests (2:206).
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three) it is worth considering the Jacksonian family relative to its Puritan predecessor as
well as its aristocratic forbear. Though sketchy, such a comparison begins to trace the
changes to family across two hundred years of unfettered democracy, a trajectory that
adds perspective to the nature and influence of Democracy’s American family.23 To this
end, the three changes weakening paternal authority are considered in turn, as they
existed among the Puritans, beginning with the overall character of the “great social
principle” of equality.
Although the Puritans evinced a kind economic, educational and class uniformity
that distinguished tbem from other colonists (1:32), the greatest mark of Puritan equality
regards the nature of the authority to which this new generation of Americans subjected
themselves. By Tocqueville’s time men were equal under the civil laws of the day which
recognized each person individually, and held him accountable to “the general laws of the
community” (2:204).24 However, while the Puritans’ laws governed the whole
community with equal severity, it was the authority of God, not the authority of man that
they recognized. His authority was reflected in their public statutes which left no room
for choice in religion and moral behavior. Moreover, despite the equality confirmed by
the Protestant worldview—specifically, its emancipation from religious hierarchy
(Kessler 1992, 783)

*yc

—the Puritans relied heavily on customs that were especially

23 Tocqueville asserts that America is the single nation where one can study the effects o f democracy in its
purest form, where democracy has “reached its natural limits” (1:14); by contrast, French democracy

remains a product o f a revolution against aristocracy.
24 Interestingly, popular sovereignty, the guiding principle behind his subjection to these laws, was the
“chief Puritan contribution to our political life” argues author Sanford Kessler (1992, 784).
25 The specific reference here is to the Protestant principle o f Sola Scriptura which gave final interpretive
authority to Biblical scriptures themselves over their interpretation by the ecclesiastical hierarchy o f the
Catholic Church; the implication, o f course, is the spiritual independence championed by Martin Luther.
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hierarchical to maintain the order that they believed God expected at home, at church and
in government (Morgan 19). Thus, despite Democracy’s limited references to Puritan
equality, this generation of Americans appeared equal, foremost, in their obedience to
God and under the “just and equal laws” with which they used to govern themselves to
this end (1:36).26 Yet in social relationships, “the Purtians were no levelers” (Morgan
18).
The extension of equality across secular society becomes more apparent when we
consider more specific measures of equality between the two generations of Americans.
Independence of mind, for example—the second notable force that Tocqueville sees
transforming the family—is easier to gauge in 17th century New England. Though
Tocqueville does not speak to this topic directly, two references to the Connecticut Code
of 1650 are telling. Along with the crimes of rape and adultery, “an outrage offered by a
son to his parents” was a capital crime (1:39). In the 19th century, by comparison,
Tocqueville observed that, “the language addressed by a son to his father [was] always
marked by mingled freedom, familiarity and affection” (2:206), while the American girl
“has scarcely ceased to be a child when she already thinks for herself, speaks with
freedom and acts on her own impulse” (2:208).
For the Puritans, religious faith and morals were strictly excluded from the
domain of independent thought. Tocqueville observes that the chief aim of their
legislation was to maintain “orderly conduct and good morals” such that the laws
“constantly invaded the domain of conscience” (1:39); for example, the preamble to the

26 A good example o f the relationship between the political means (e.g. laws, ordinances, etc.) used by the
Puritans to achieve their religious ends (i.e. the “glory o f God”) can be found in the Act with which the
Puritans dedicated the establishment o f their colony (2:36).
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Connecticut Code of 1650 declares “whosoever shall worship any other God than the
Lord shall surely be put to death” (1:39). Nearly two centuries later however, the
consequence for blasphemy had tempered with the deepening of intellectual freedom.
Tocqueville recalls an incident during his stay in New York when a court witness
publicly denied the existence of God and was simply dismissed when the judge found no
precedent for such a belief as a legitimate basis for testimony (1:317). However limited
the evidence, these cases suggest that by Tocqueville’s time equality had strengthened its
hold on American habits of thought, and relaxed the dogma that had precluded it from
Puritan minds.
The final factor weakening paternal authority, the division of property, can be
well imagined with respect to the Puritans. Tocqueville states precisely that entail—the
aristocratic law ensuring a complete transfer of property to a single heir upon his father’s
death—was only formally abolished around the time of the Revolution (1:53). Prior to
this, according to Tocqueville, “the colonies followed the English law of entail” (2:369).
Since this formal shift in inheritance law is well-documented, the Puritans’ collection of
property can be assayed with confidence.
Because labor, not land, was scarce in the colonies, large estates were not
uncommon. To what extent early New England families accumulated land is difficult to
know, although it was probably less than that of their Virginian counterparts—given the
importance of southern agriculture—but surely more than that of Jacksonian families,
since entail was repealed in 1786. In sum, while the first Puritans obviously began
colonial life without inherited land, a continent open to cultivation and laws that passed
property intact between generations must have quickly changed this fact. Thus, until the
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abolition of entail, American families appeared aristocratic with respect to land
inheritance. Moreover, save for the very earliest Puritans, necessity, if not choice, must
not have brought them together in the same kind of proximity that Tocqueville found in
1831.
The Jacksonian family alongside its Puritan predecessor presents an interesting
comparison, however a definitive treatment is beyond the scope and tangential to the aim
of this paper. Moreover, the observations drawn from Tocqueville are made tentative by
a very limited consideration of the Puritan family in Democracy. What seems reasonably
apparent, however, is that equality of conditions’ specific effects on judgment and
inheritance, and possibly its ubiquity in American society generally, was less prominent
in Puritan New England than in the America that Tocqueville saw. Thus, assuming the
accuracy of equality’s perceived effects on the family, we can be fairly sure that Puritan
fathers retained a kind of moral authority reminiscent of aristocratic families, a trait that
had diminished by Tocqueville’s time. For the purposes of this paper, the relevant
question becomes: How did this loss affect the moral discipline that Tocqueville found
germane to the success of the New England colonies and to the maintenance of free
societies generally?
Difference, Equality and Justice in American Marriage

Tocqueville’s praise for colonial life centered largely on its attention to morals
which instructed political habits that in turn, supported freedom. In the Puritans’ case,
the presence of ordered families inspired New Englanders to codify religious mores into
punitive laws that ensured this relationship. However, as equality began to compromise
the father’s stewardship of tradition, how did morality remain complementary to politics?
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Given equality’s increasing force on the American family, it seems likely that any change
to the conjugal union would mirror those between parent and child, yet its effect on
marriage was not the kind of leveling observed between fathers and sons. Rather,
equality was manifested in marriage such that both sexes were raised by keeping them
distinct. In doing so, 19th century Americans recognized equality by placing women in
positions of moral influence predicated on their absence from politics (and public life
generally) and their subordination to husbands. Interestingly, the novelty of subordinate
females instructing civic morality resonated with Tocqueville for its normative value as
well as its political wisdom. On his view, equally valued gender roles without equal
rights and duties, was essential to both the future of American democracy and to nature’s
sense of justice.
As he begins his observations of the equality of the sexes, Tocqueville makes
clear that equality exerted an influence on married couples as strongly as it did elsewhere
in society. He writes “I believe that the social changes that bring nearer to the same level
superiors and inferiors will raise women and make her more and more the equal of men”
(2:222). He points out however, that equality’s effect on American marriage takes a
notably different form. Within the parent/child and the sibling relationships, natural
bonds are accompanied by decreased hierarchy, weakened authority and a robust and
early independence; between spouses however, equality naturalizes the conjugal union—
basing it on love and choice instead of interests—without compromising the moral and
physical distinctions between the sexes. This unique rendering of sexual equality is
highlighted by the difference between gender relations in America and France.
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What best distinguishes the American wife from her French counterpart is her
relative social value, seen in the respective institutions of education and marriage.
Among the Americans, Tocqueville notes two aspects of society, religion and
commerce—the legacies of America’s dual founding—that explain the importance of
women in American public opinion; Americans’ faith in women’s natural moral capacity
inclines them to respect and protect female virtue, while the country’s commercial
instincts demand a high degree of public tranquility which begins with an orderly, settled
home life (2:212). Both priorities are achieved by sequestering American wives at home,
a potentially challenging task in an age of equality, but one facilitated by the uniquely
democratic education of American girls (2:212).
Unlike French women, educated in much the same “reserved, retired
and.. .conventional” way as in aristocratic times, American women are empowered to use
their own reason and independence to navigate the unique challenges of democratic
womanhood, perhaps most importantly, the novel task of choosing a husband (2:210).

ry’l

In fact, it is the self-knowledge and discipline of her education that helps the young
American woman accept the subordinate role of domestic wife and mother, cast upon her
by public opinion once she married (2:213).

Moreover, by submitting herself to the

dictates of public opinion she exhibits a kind of feminine comage, distinct from the

27 The reader will recall that until very recently, marriages were based on interests, not love, and female
choice was virtually unknown. Countless examples o f proscribed love affairs, from the timeless Romeo
and Juliet to the contemporary Aladdin remind us o f this fact.
28 Tocqueville writes “When the time for choosing a husband arrives, that cold and stem reasoning power
which has been educated and invigorated by the free observation o f the world teaches an American woman
that a spirit o f levity and independence in the bonds o f marriage is a constant subject of annoyance, not of
pleasure... .and that the sources o f a married woman’s happiness are in the home o f her husband” (2:213).
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commercial boldness of men, but no less recognized by society at large.29 Such public
approbation remains a testament to American wives’ important place in Jacksonian
America, albeit one dissimilar to their husbands’. French women, by contrast, educated
to be ignorant if not suspicious of themselves, learned nothing of such courage, for they
were not expected to “ sacrifice... [their] pleasures to [their] duties” the way American
women were, which of course they did not (2:212). Tocqueville believes that the social
consequence of such an education is often an ill-conceived and chaotic marriage that
stems from its inability to meet the demands of newly democratic society, particularly the
need for domestic order in which men and boys find peace, recognize duties, and gain
moral edification which they take into the public arena (1:315).
By fostering a settled home life, Tocqueville believes that gender differentiation
supports American morals much like class hierarchy fostered sacrifice in aristocratic
ages; moreover, it does so within the normative ethos of its time—the mandate of
equality. In each case, Tocqueville appears to recognize the unifying power of
difference; that is, by excluding some part of society from the social experience of the
other—serfs from nobles in aristocracy, women from men in America—difference was
retained as a basis for duties as well as rights, a division that Tocqueville found essential
to the maintenance of order and propriety (2:223).30 In America, the non-competitive
nature of gender relations helped men retain a commitment to something other than selfinterest (i.e. family) and gave women an influential forum in which to exercise their

29 The best example o f female courage can be found in “Appendix U” o f the Bradley version of
Democracy (2:381).
30 See Concluding Thoughts section for a more detailed discussion o f difference in democracy.
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moral strength. Consequently, both sexes reaped the salutary effects of difference.31 In
sum, as the Puritans’ punitive laws and the moral suasion of fathers faded under
deepening equality of conditions, Americans relied on the heightened importance of
women as domestic moral educators to replace the piety and self-discipline of colonial
times.

39

This feat was accomplished by the sharp division of the genders in marriage.
Tocqueville’s admiration for American marriage and its supporting ethos of

equality through difference is explicit; in fact, his (arguably) strongest claim in
Democracy concerns this unique institution. He writes, “If I were asked... .to what the
singular prosperity and growing strength of [Americans] ought mainly to be attributed, I
should reply: To the superiority o f their women (italics added)” (2:225). Understandably,
such a bold statement has not gone unnoticed by scholars.33 However, the view that
“superiority” here denotes a comparison of morals by gender (i.e. that American women

31 The value o f democratic difference—even hierarchy—is supported by Tocqueville’s cautionary view o f
its converse, equality: “It is not the equality o f condition that makes men immoral and irreligious: but when
men, being equal, are also immoral and irreligious, the effects o f immorality and irreligion more easily
manifest themselves, because men have but little influence over each other...” (2:384).
32 This observation merits further analysis on two points: the loss o f piety and the changing roles o f women
from Puritan to Jacksonian America. On the former point, Tocqueville shows that while the Puritans were
constantly observing God—from the hierarchy o f their social relations to the biblical mandates o f their civil
laws—Jacksonian Americans more consistently separate religion from civil society, which they leave just
only once a week, on Sundays, to return to church where “the soul resumes possession and contemplation
o f itself’ (2:152). When it comes to the role o f women, the new influence o f Jacksonian wives signals an
equalizing o f the sexes (albeit an incomplete one) that far surpasses the gender hierarchies o f the Puritans.
Though Tocqueville is inexplicit on the role o f Puritan women, historians portray them as sharply
subordinate to husbands who instructed them in nearly all matters, but especially religion (Morgan 44).
This contrast to Democracy’s 19th century moral matriarch reflects the deepening effect o f equality, even
upon views o f God and nature; nineteenth century Americans accepted innate intellectual parity between
the sexes, while Puritan customs held women to be, by nature, physically and intellectually inferior.
Although Puritan wives were protected from abuse and commands contradictory to the civil laws o f their
community, their duties were strictly domestic (Morgan 45); she was—if we are to believe the sermons o f
the day—to “guid[e] the house [and] not guid[e] the Husband” (Morgan 43). To appreciate the importance
o f gender order in Puritan society, we might consider the case o f Ann Hutchinson, who was banished from
Massachusetts after being accused o f breaking the Fifth Commandment by acting more as “a Husband than
Wife, and a preacher than a Hearer; and a Magistrate than a Subject” (Morgan 19).
33 See page four o f Chapter I for examples.
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are morally superior to their husbands) is a misinterpretation. To be fair, such a view is
reasonable given Tocqueville’s explicit mention of women as the “protectors of morals”
and his suggestion that one natural difference between the sexes—moral sense—is owed
to women (1:315; 2:222). While these observations are true, they mislead Tocqueville’s
point which is clarified in context.
Two observations suggest that Tocqueville’s claim regards neither the sexes in
America nor morality itself. Concerning the latter, since the basis for female morality
appears to be nature, French women must possess the same capacity vis-a-vis their
husbands as American women do theirs, rendering morality an inappropriate basis to
distinguish American women. Adding to the confusion is the following observation
made just before Tocqueville’s “superiority” claim; “Thus, then, while [Americans] have
allowed the social inferiority of woman to continue, they have done all they could to raise
her morally and intellectually to the level of man” (2:225). If Tocqueville speaks of
gender superiority instead of national character, one wonders why Americans would
“raise” a morally (perhaps even intellectually) superior being to the level of an inferior.
The idea itself defies good sense, not to mention logic.
Given the interpretive problems of moral or gender superiority, Tocqueville’s
claim must concern something else. In my opinion, the unique social station of American
women, enabled by their precocious education and realized by their respected position in
the home, is most likely. Moreover, this reinterpretation follows the spirit of the chapter
which compares French and American public opinion and avoids the textual
contradictions encountered by the other interpretations of superiority. Most importantly,
it is only with an accurate understanding of “superiority” that one can grasp the full
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nature of Tocqueville’s praise for American marriage—his admiration of its justice as
well as its political utility.
That Tocqueville praises difference in am age that ceaselessly works against it
raises the issue of justice, an important but often hidden dimension of Democracy, a work
whose judgment is often overshadowed by its explanatory power, despite Tocqueville’s
expressed intention to achieve both (2:349); nonetheless, Tocqueville’s normative stance
on difference and equality in American institutions surfaces throughout and appears to be
based on social consequences rather than political utility (a la Machiavelli) or,
conversely, the achievement of religious idealism (e.g. the aim of Puritan customs); that
God is just is simply understood. Thus, Tocqueville views those institutions that
favorably affect the human condition as both justifiable and divinely inspired.
Contrasting the institutions of marriage and slavery—each characterized by difference
and varying degrees of hierarchy—exemplifies this point.
For its virtues of order and moral influence, Tocqueville clearly finds that gender
difference in American marriage helps support the commercial and political needs of the
nation, yet he also finds that individual human improvement occurs when institutions are
instructed by nature. In stratified American marriages, both sexes avail themselves of
natural moral and physical differences and are raised in the process (2:222). By contrast,
the hierarchy of American slavery exacts a pernicious toll on master, slave and society,
writ large. In large part, this degradation stems from the unnatural use of race as a basis
for rights and duties.
Tocqueville notes that superiority persists in the minds of slave nations long after
the institution itself. In antiquity, such prejudice was mitigated by limited terms of
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servitude, after whiqh freed slaves became indistinguishable from masters (1:371). In
America however, racial prejudice in the North—sharper and more divisive than in the
South—persists because assimilation never follows emancipation (1:373).34 While
Southern society remained “more tolerant and compassionate” toward blacks, slavery
here fostered different problems of which idleness among masters and brutish ignorance
among slaves were chief (1:373,374, 379, 395).
Both for its promotion of civic stagnation as well as human debasement,
Tocqueville denounced the consequences of slavery much as Thomas Jefferson did; and
like Jefferson, he believed that God would not overlook this iniquitous practice. In one
of Tocqueville’s rare but powerful anecdotes, his notion of providential justice is
exemplified. In it, he relates the sad end to an old man who had children with one of his
slaves and could not escape the horror of knowing his sons would be sold into slavery
upon his death. Toequeville writes, “when I saw him, he was a prey to all the anguish of
despair; and I understand how awful is the retribution of Nature upon those who have
broken her laws” (1:396).35 Indeed, no other practice in Democracy—save perhaps for
the habits of the materialists (see Chapter III)—does Tocqueville find as execrable to
humanity as slavery.

34 One o f Tocqueville’s solutions to the problem o f slavery is intermarriage, the result being the eventual
obliteration o f racial distinctions.
35 Another example o f Nature’s retributive justice can be found in the illicit relations that plague aristocratic
marriages which suffocate the natural love between men and women who wish to marry but cannot (2:216).
36 Moreover, Tocqueville censures each for similar reasons. Slavery degrades man by treating him as
chattel, but American slavery goes even deeper, enslaving him, principally, not with chains but through
“despotism and.. .violence against the human mind” (1:395). By being denied an education, and the use o f
higher faculties o f thought through lives o f relentless labor, American slaves are not simply stopped from
exercising their humanity, they are convinced that it does not exist. In this sense, the ethos o f materialism,
which denies the existence o f the soul, and thus anything beyond the needs o f the flesh, is slavery.
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The consequences of marriage vis-a-vis slavery illustrate how the distinct effects
of difference and the nature of its foundation—not simply the attribute itself—determines
the relative justice of human institutions; foremost for the purposes of this paper are the
consequences of the natural family. The question we might ask, then, and one which may
help fill Tocqueville’s silence on the natural family’s net effect is: How does Tocqueville
assess the consequences of this institution (and others)? The answer appears to lie in how
well it meets the needs of different ages, whose people are predisposed towards certain
social and political habits of their time (2:153).
In aristocratic ages, both the intransigent poverty of the serf and the opulence of
the noble focused attention to spiritual contemplation; the latter men, contented beyond
satisfaction, ignorerj their own material well-being while the poor, though they wished for
greater welfare, sought refuge from their misery in the divine and the heavenly (2:153).
By contrast, democrats, who live with looser social forms, education, and much closer to
a modicum of material comfort, remain forever inclined towards utility and convenience
at the expense of the ideal and the spiritual (1:153). Moreover, Tocqueville fears that
such habits turn democrats away from their “sublimest faculties” as humans (2:154). To
combat such habits, Tocqueville remarks “It should be the unceasing object of the
legislators of democracies and of all the virtuous and enlightened men who live there to
raise the souls of their fellow citizens and keep them uplifted towards heaven” (2:154).
Thus, it is worth considering the ways in which American marriage accomplishes this
task.
Reconsidering French and American gender relations from this perspective brings
the relative justice of marriage into sharper focus. By virtue of their democratic
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character, both societies require strong habits of mind and spirit to combat predilections
for physical well-being. On this point, the two societies diverge sharply. The differentbut-equal status of American spouses creates “cold but virtuous women instead of
affectionate wives and agreeable companions to men” while inspiring a kind of hearty
female courage that is unflaggingly loyal (2:211). Interestingly, each of these qualities is
derived from the cultivation of the female will and the tempering of physical passions, be
they sexual or material.37 This importance of mastering physical desires materializes
even in American legislation, which, as shown earlier, has become far milder since
Puritan times, save for the prosecution of rape which remained a capital crime in
Tocqueville's time (2:225).
By contrast, when French society does in fact punish this crime, it is done with
less severity, a product, perhaps, of its conciliatory attitude toward the demands of the
body (2:225). French men, for example, portray themselves as the “slaves of women”
and “under their despotic sway” yet consider them “seductive but imperfect beings,”
while women relish the chance to present themselves as “futile, feeble and timid”
(2:224). In both cases, inordinate attention is paid to physicality, the woman, to her
presentation as coquettishly helpless, the man, to his inability to resist her seductive
display. Both attitudes serve, rather than eschew, sexual desire—the apotheoses of
physical gratification and, moreover, what democrats need least.
When it comes to marriage and the genders, American public opinion functions as
Tocqueville would have a wise legislator, sanctioning institutions whose habits transcend

37 While modesty clearly follows “cold and virtuous women,” their rejection o f material comforts is made
clear in Tocqueville’s examples o f female courage in his chapter The Young Woman in the Character o f
Wife, and in Appendix U (2:214, 383-84).
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corporeal desires, a quality both pragmatic and just given the distinct needs of democratic
society. By his own measure, these needs have changed with the deepening of equality
since colonial times. With its unique division of genders, the family has managed to
meet these needs by raising woman’s functional import to society beyond her respected,
but explicitly subordinate place among the Puritans, and far above her accessory status in
aristocratic times. By contrast, French women have retained aristocratic dispositions in
an age that needs more from them than they have been prepared to give. Such dependent
habits were less consequential to aristocracies, which took their moral and political
bearings exclusively from men; this, of course, had ceased to be the case by
Tocqueville’s time.
Clearly, Tocqueville sees disparate needs emerging from the habits of democratic
and aristocratic life, yet the normative end which these needs serve remains constant;
though he does not explicitly say so, all evidence points to the improvement of
humankind (i.e. intellectual, material and spiritual) as the “goal towards which the human
race ought ever to be tending” (2:153). The strongly ordered American family emerges
as a practical and just prescription to the general needs of democratic society, yet
democracy’s dangers manifest in discrete domains of social life that target these same
aspects of ourselves that Tocqueville insists we maintain. Just how the American family
addresses the particular afflictions of the mind, body and heart, and whether in doing so
it maintains its virtue as a just and practical antidote, remains unanswered. The
remainder of the paper is devoted to these questions.
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CHAPTER III

THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND DEMOCRATIC HABITS OF THE MIND

The Family as Political Medium

Although the family has offered a window into politics throughout history, is it
perhaps an antiquated perspective from which to view the new political science of
democracy? After all, by Tocqueville’s time the family had clearly lost the political
function it held under aristocracy. Might a more proximate feature—say, laws or formal
institutions—better explain the fate of democratic equality? In fact, Tocqueville speaks
directly to this point, outlining the causes that maintain democracy in America. In order
of primacy, he concludes, “[PJhysical circumstances are less efficient than the laws, and
the laws infinitely less so than the customs of the people” (1:334).38 The importance of
customs is exemplified by the complicated nature of American federalism, embodied in
the Constitution and maintained by a politically astute American public.39 By contrast,
notes Tocqueville, the Mexicans, despite having modeled our laws, lack the habits
needed to sustain them and have consequently suffered the excesses of dual sovereignty
under federalism (1:173). These examples serve to illustrate Tocqueville’s claim that of
the classes of causes through which to view democracy’s dangers, customs is the most
appropriate. Thus, insofar as the family is a product of Anglo-American customs, and no

38 Tocqueville defines customs as “the whole moral and intellectual condition o f a people” (1:310).
39 On the complex nature o f the Constitution, Tocqueville writes, “In examining the Constitution o f the
United States... one is startled at the variety o f information and the amount o f discernment that it
presupposes in the people whom it is meant to govern” (1:172).
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longer a political arm of aristocracy, I am confident that it is well-chosen as a window
into democracy.
Given the suitability of family for this task, the chapters that follow try to identify
the family’s influence on equality as it manifests itself in the chief democratic habits of
mind, body, and heart; specifically, it attempts to show how the natural family interacts
with the most acute democratic dangers emerging from these categories. In an effort to
fill the silence left by Tocqueville on the natural family’s overall effect on society, I have
attempted to ‘connect the dots,’ so to speak, between these topics in Democracy. Before
beginning this process, however, a few words on methodology are appropriate.
Because the categories to which these dangers have been assigned are mine, not
Tocqueville’s, there is inevitable overlap as they appear throughout Democracy. Thus, at
the risk of reducing Tocqueville’s work to artificial dimensions I aim to deconstruct the
dangers of equality and the merits of family, a matter of examining the parts to
understand the whole. Furthermore, the dangers addressed here are extracted from the
whole of Democracy but are not comprehensive; I have tried to identify the most
prominent and as I can tell, acute dangers, as Tocqueville saw them arising from
American democracy. If I have failed to assign dangers to their most appropriate
categories, I believe that the essential character of the danger has nevertheless been
preserved.
Additionally, care has been taken to distinguish between the dangers that
Tocqueville saw and the democratic habits that give rise to them—a challenge at times,
but, as I felt, necessary, as the simple presence of these habits does not foreshadow
democracy’s demise, but rather presents an unknown future in which society faces
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dangers, but also opportunities. Thus, each category’s chief habits lie in a similar relation
to its consequences which range between an ideal outcome and a perversion, the latter, of
t
40
course, representing its greatest danger.

Finally, readers may notice a certain degree of ex-post reasoning in the present
analysis; that is, using equality’s stated effects on family to frame an analysis of the
family’s reciprocal effect on the dangers of equality, seems circular. Interestingly,
evidence shows that Tocqueville recognized such reciprocal causality as part of
democratic life, particularly the republican embodiment of popular sovereignty, which he
calls “the slow and quiet action of society upon itself’ (1: 433). This issue is, in my
view, an inevitable presence in Tocqueville’s work, which has a difficult time
accommodating the stricter methodological expectations of empirical social science; I
believe the author would agree.
Dogma, Doubt and Majority Opinion

It should come as no surprise that the greatest dangers of Americans’ intellectual
habits stem from the equality of conditions under which they live, the same principle that
guides Tocqueville’s full analysis of American democracy. When considering the
intellectual consequences of equality, two dispositions come to the fore. Tocqueville
writes “I very clearly discern two tendencies; one leading the mind of every man to
untried thoughts and the other prohibiting him from thinking at all” (2:10). In tandem,
dogma and doubt precipitate a powerful majority opinion, which in its proper form
supports republicanism, the backbone of American democracy, yet when corrupted
becomes Tocqueville’s now famous “tyranny of the majority.” This phenomenon

40 See the Appendix for the democratic habits and their consequences.
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embodies the chief intellectual danger to liberty for its diminution of individual self
conception, characterized by insecurity and self-doubt, and enfeebled notions of
individual rights.
Tocqueville observes that Americans’ philosophical habits are best characterized
by the subjection of truth to individual reason while remaining skeptical towards accepted
forms of knowledge (e.g. tradition) as well as the opinions of one’s contemporaries (2:47). He notes that this disposition was derived from moves towards Humanism in the 16th
and 17th centuries by men like Luther, Bacon and Descartes, but did not take root in
•L

democratic society until equality of conditions reached a certain critical mass in the 18
century when these ideas, which coalesced around self-determination, appealed to a
public majority (2:6).
The subjectivity of Americans’ philosophical bent, suggests excessive degrees of
personal judgment following their habits of intellectual freedom; moral relativism, for
example, comes to mind. But on this point, Tocqueville’s fears were mixed, for
alongside democratic skepticism he perceived a uniformly religious character to
American society that circumscribed the purview of doubt to politics, but not morality,
which was governed instead by dogma. He writes, “I believe that the men who live under
the new forms of society [equality-based democracy] will make frequent use of their
private judgment, but I am far from thinking that they will often abuse it” (2:8). In his
view, religious dogma worked to contain the subjectivity to which democratic minds
were prone. Nevertheless, Tocqueville understood that both skepticism and dogma
remained potential threats to democracy, most prominently when the two combined.
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Despite the strength of democratic skepticism, Tocqueville observed that
democratic doubters can fully escape dogma neither as a society, whose ideas must
coalesce around certain “common beliefs,” nor as individuals, who must take on faith
certain premises if they wish to reason beyond fundamentals (2:10). To Tocqueville,
dogmatic belief remains a fixture of the intellectual life of any people, regardless of age
or regime. He writes “Thus the question is, not to know whether any intellectual
authority exists in an age of democracy, but simply where it resides...” (2:10). Since
skepticism debunks the supernatural, and private judgment trumps competing opinions,
intellectual authority among democracies resides not in a particular man or class, nor
“above humanity” but in the public majority, where the individual typically finds himself
but also a power superior to him, taken individually (2:10-11).41
Augmenting the conceptual locus of authority in democratic majorities is a
democratic aversion to secondary powers; that is, equality not only gives final authority
to majority opinion, but places no other man or class between it and individual belief
within the minds of men, concentrating majority power beyond even that of kings
(2:307). In democracies, the popular majority rises as the superior and sole powerbroker.
Consequently, man’s faith in his own rights and his willingness to dissent is easily
overwhelmed by the preponderance of the majority (2:307). For this reason, Tocqueville
feared Americans’ subservience to public dogma could “confine the action of private
judgment within narrower limits than are suited to either the greatness or the happiness of
the human race” (2:12). This truncated independence of mind concerned Tocqueville as

41 To this point Tocqueville writes, “At periods of equality men have no faith in one another, by reason of
their common resemblapce; but this very resemblance gives them an almost unbounded confidence in the
judgment o f the public; for it would seem probable that, as they are all endowed with equal means of
judging, the greater truth should go with the greater number” (2:11).
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a consequence of democratic dogma generally, but especially if the majority ever
combined it with skepticism. On an individual basis, moral relativity, while pernicious,
could be contained by the power of a public that held fixed notions of religious morality;
but if public opinion itself ever mixed the two, and held doubt as its dogma, not only
would religious norms become unsettled among the majority, but the few defenders that
religion retained would be silenced by the powerful democratic majority. Thus, through
their combined habits of dogma and doubt, Americans unwittingly raise the chief
intellectual danger of the democratic age—tyrannical majority opinion.42
To be clear, majority opinion, strictly speaking, is not tyrannical; on the contrary,
Tocqueville saw it as a kind of ideological compass directing American republicanism,
democracy’s governing principle which he called “the tranquil rule of the majority” and
from which the state derives its legitimate power (1:434). When unrestrained, however,
republicanism can easily devolve into majority tyranny whose constrictive effect on
democratic habits of mind were already visible in America and captured by a curious
observation: the country has no great writers (1:275). It has none, claims Tocqueville,
because the homage which writers must pay to their audience limits democratic novelists’
ability to challenge established thought, for such criticism, unlike in previous ages, can be
aimed at none but the majority who maintains the status quo (1:275).43

42 Interestingly, the kind o f exacting public opinion o f which Tocqueville speaks seems to have appeared in
Puritan times when it subjected all to the same oppressive laws. On the severity o f the laws and customs to
which the Puritans subjected themselves, Tocqueville writes “These errors are no doubt discreditable to
human nature, which is incapable o f laying firm hold on what is true and just and is often reduced to the
alternative o f two excesses” (1:41). However, while the Puritans were sensationally dogmatic in their
moral code, it was religious conviction, not relativity to which they held fast, a much preferable, even “the
most desirable” kind o f dogma (1:41). Thus, while Tocqueville may lament the severity with which
Puritan laws subjugated individual opinion, he found its morality to have salutary effect on society.
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It may seem odd that such a statement about writers could be true of a country
where independence of thought appears so prominent, but when the stakes of dissent are
considered in light of the power of public opinion, Tocqueville’s claim gains traction.
Consider the following on oppression: “The authority of a king,” he writes “controls the
actions of men withput subduing their will. But the majority possesses a power that is
physical and moral at the same time, which acts upon the will as much as upon the
actions and represses not only all contest, but all controversy” (1:273). By stripping
nothing from dissenters but their good name, a tyrannical majority makes pariahs out of
men; it robs them of their cherished social equality, and in doing so, effectively targets
democrats’ greatest weakness—their will, or, the fortitude of their soul.44
Interestingly, the target of majority tyranny—the will—is the same dimension of
life cultivated in democratic women through education and showcased later by their
domestic courage; ip a general way then, women bring to families a quality that counters
the effects of tyranny, most directly on themselves, but also on their children in whom
they surely inculcate similar strengths.45 In boys, however, a counter-insurgency against
their mother’s education begins at adolescence, when they start to become their fathers’

43

As an aside, Tocqueville’s observation puts the works o f one o f America’s greatest writers, Mark Twain,
in a clearer light, for Twain’s genius is his ability, through fiction, to challenge his readers’ conventions
without them realizing it. Given Tocqueville’s point on great writers, it is worth considering whether
Twain’s works could have garnered the same popularity if they were explicitly political.
44

By contrast, Tocqueville implies that such ostracism had little effect on aristocrats, whose intimate
familiarity with the soul strengthened their resolve to pursue unpopular beliefs (and practices), since they
often felt sanctioned by a higher power (1:274).

45

Men, too, evidence determination in their efforts, but the end of these efforts is not the sacrifice of
material pleasures to the interests o f the soul, but rather glory in the eyes o f their contemporaries, which
largely revolves around mastering the physical world, not one’s self. Democracy’s chapter on male honor
makes this clear (2:249-50).
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social equals and the intellectual consequences of equality (e.g. dogma and doubt) begin
to take hold. Still, while female courage does not prevent tyranny from exploiting the
weakness of democratic wills, it mitigates the effects of such an attack by modeling
resolve and overall moral strength in the family.
Under equality, the majority also compromises the occasional revolutionary state
of mind needed to sustain American republicanism. Although republicanism remained
foremost a deliberate, reflexive process of political adjustment, Tocqueville recognized
the need for great change as it developed. He writes, “republican notions insinuate
themselves into all the ideas, opinions and habits of the Americans and are formally
recognized by the laws; and before the laws could be altered, the whole community must
be revolutionized” (1:436). This process occurred on a larger scale (the whole Western
world) with the Protestant Reformation, the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment
thought, as the ideas of Luther, Bacon and Descartes took centuries to normalize but
ultimately proved the revolutionary nature of self-determination, the principle underlying
popular sovereignty and republicanism.46
Unfortunately, the openness to revolutionary thought needed by republicanism is
progressively compromised by equality; skepticism, specifically, distances men from the
views of others—revolutionary or not—while their fears of majority censure silence
progressive voices. Thus, as equality deepens, the majority gains strength and begins to
restrict both the presentation and the reception of new ideas. It enervates the will of man

46 Tocqueville understands self-determination, the idea behind the movements mentioned here, as the
notion that “providence has given to every human being the degree o f reason necessary to direct himself in
the affairs that interest him exclusively”(l:435-36).
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by turning his powerful habit of doubt upon himself. “The majority do not need to force
him; they convince him,” writes Tocqueville (2:274-75). The consequence is a general
kind of apathy that precipitates the death of republicanism, a process that must eschew
intellectual stasis, and reserve a place even for great change, to maintain “the slow and
quiet action of society upon itself’ (1: 433).
Paralleling the mediocrity of ideas under entrenched equality is the mediocrity of
ambition; just as skepticism distributes intellectual authority among men (save for the
ultimate authority that dogma vests in the majority), equality disburses opportunities for
wealth, making few men rich, but few poor (2:258). Discouraged by the energy and time
required for great success, democrats train their sights on closer goals which are pursued
piecemeal, reinforcing conservative, prudent habits of mind (2:258). “A man cannot
gradually expand his mind as he does his house,” writes Tocqueville (2:258). Such
modest goals, however, exacerbate the great weakness of the democratic soul by turning
ambition towards the easier, material satisfactions of the body and away from loftier
challenges of honor and glory, desired by the spirit. Consequently, Tocqueville fears “for
democratic society much less from the boldness than from the mediocrity of desires”
(2:261).
Tocqueville makes clear that habits of mind under a tyrannical majority support
neither the revolutionary mindset nor the ambition needed to eschew apathy. And yet,
the sharp separation of people under hierarchy also settles the mind into habits of thought
too fixed to serve this end (2:274). Between these extremes, however, is a condition that
does support revolutionary thought, and which may spur ambition as well. In this state
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ideas are less settled than in aristocratic times but “[conditions] are sufficiently unequal
for men to exercise a vast power on the minds of one another” (2:274).
On the domestic front, the family creates this intermediary state by dividing
jurisdiction of the principal habits of thought between the sexes—the woman over
religion and dogma, the man over politics and doubt—reducing competition between
them and fostering the moral influence of wives over their husbands.47 The religious
norms she embodies reflect the most dogmatic themes of intellectual life and become a
crucial limit to male skepticism, yet one that also helps justify its use; by demarcating the
limits of dogma from those of doubt, female morality adds confidence to the use of male
skepticism within its proper field. Without such dogma, Tocqueville argues, “doubt gets
hold of the higher powers of the intellect and half paralyzes all the others” so that even
opinions on secular matters become “ill-defended and easily abandoned” (2:22).
Moreover, by modeling morality instead of simply preaching it, women add efficacy to
the moral discipline of democratic (i.e. empirical) husbands, perhaps more so than the
sermons of America’s clergymen. Thus, her role within the family helps confirm rather
than revolutionize ideas, but when it comes to progressive thought, the relevant question
concerns habit more than content: By allowing themselves to be moved by the morality
of their wives at home, do men develop habits of intellectual flexibility in public life that
contradict their skeptical dispositions? Even a small move in this direction would
account for a less hostile atmosphere for new, even revolutionary ideas in public life 48

47 That men have a political/public influence on their wives is taken for granted. O f the Americans
Tocqueville writes, “They hold that every association must have a head in order to accomplish its object,
and that the natural head o f the conjugal association is man. They do not therefore deny him the right of
directing his partner....” (2:223).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

49
In a final way, family checks tyranny by promoting what distinguishes
republicanism from it, specifically, limited majority power. Such limits, Tocqueville
claims, are found in “humanity, justice and reason” in the moral world, and “vested
rights” in the political (1:434). This is to say that a popular majority, however strong, can
never mandate the terms of these principles. The family helps recognize these barriers in
much the same way that it respects God and nature, by separating stewardship of morality
and politics.
For their part, women symbolize the moral features above in a few ways, clearest
of which, perhaps, is their embodiment of humanity; while the democratic woman is
certainly not the first to bear and raise children, she inhabits the novel position of moral
authority whereby her experience as a mother cultivating life is translated into social
norms that respect humanity. Captured best by Christian morality, they are promulgated
by her at home. Her recognition of reason, however, comes less from a uniquely female
experience with this principle (e.g. motherhood in the case of humanity) than from what
she makes of reason, once acquired. Tocqueville points out that public opinion does not
deny her an education on par with men’s, as her intellectual faculties are expected to hold
equal promise (2:225). The two sexes use their education, however, to serve different
ends: Men employ reason for personal judgment and in service to the skepticism that
underlies popular sovereignty; women utilize it in the form of foresight and to recognize

48 To take this point further, perhaps husbands’ receptivity to the influence o f their wives—moral or
otherwise— is attributable not to the persuasion o f sex, as Allan Bloom argues, but to their perception that
their improvement comes not only from someone who is not their social equal (and thus not their
competitor), but from an extension o f themselves. This may be so in die conventional sense—that through
marriage the man makes the woman “his”— and in a deeper, religious sense as well. Ephesians 5 speaks of
the unity o f husband and wife as one flesh and that by loving their wives, men really love themselves.
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the merits of self-restraint. Thus, female reason is not a novel principle that women bring
to the moral world, but rather a new application thereof.
Women’s promotion of justice has to do with the favorable consequences of her
recognized role as “protector of morals,” mentioned at the end of Chapter II; to
recapitulate briefly, as the greatest needs of democratic peoples demand an attention to
the soul, women meet this challenge through their embodiment of moral resolve and
material restraint, habits that counter democrats’ excessive passions of the body. As her
moral function is sanctioned by public opinion, the values she promotes are normalized
and received throughout the family, where they raise the attention of all its members to
the needs of the soul. Insofar as this outcome is favorable to democracy it is also, in
Tocqueville’s view, just.
That women add these unique dimensions to the moral world is not to say that
men do not support humanity, reason or justice, but simply that women bring a certain
perspective to these features that men either lack (in the case of motherhood and justice)
or reinterpret (in their use of reason). Moreover, the moral world, as we have seen with
religious dogma, gives structure and limits to the world of politics, where men's role is
more obvious. Her?, Tocqueville speaks of vested rights, which American men promote
through their participation in public affairs. However, vested rights differ from their
moral counterparts in a key way; they reflect social conditions rather than exist prior to
them, yet they still lie beyond the limits of legitimate majority rule. A complete
understanding of this complex feature requires a clearer definition of the principle of
right, which in Tocqueville’s words is “simply that of virtue introduced into the political
world” (1:254).
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Recall briefly that Tocqueville believes that the needs of societies differ with the
age and its circumstances (2:153). Thus political virtue—the principle of right—is
different across time; in democracies, it is tailored to what befits equality of conditions.
Although Tocqueville did not feel that “the exercise of political rights should
immediately be granted to all men,”49 democratic equality has rent the blanket of faith
that had covered the aristocratic world such that no manner of governing is left but
compulsion or persuasion (1:252,255); if men are not to be ruled by force, they must
now learn to rule themselves, and within the bounds of morality, a task predicated on the
right of self-determination, which the Americans claim for, and vest in, themselves.
Through this process, democracy ties the personal interests of individuals to the
political well-being of the community, which each man helps direct (1:255). Moreover,
respect for rights is cultivated by the extent to which they can be claimed, the reason why
American men support vested rights by living them; Tocqueville notes that in Jacksonian
America even the lower classes display a keen appreciation for their rights thanks to their
steady good use (2:254). As men gain a familiarity with their rights, they also recognize
their limits, understood as follows: “[Ejveryone is the best and sole judge of his own
private interest and.. .society has no right to control a man’s actions unless they are
prejudicial to the common weal or unless the common weal demands his help” (1:67).
This tenet presents a difficult proposition, as the common good is defined by the
republican majority, yet vested rights exist beyond the limits of its power. Could, then, a

49 This denial of right presumably rests on its endangerment o f some, and therefore its lack o f political
virtue. Tocqueville writes “It cannot be doubted that the moment at which political rights are granted to a
people that had before been without them is a very critical one, that the measure, though often necessary is
always dangerous. A child may kill before he is aware o f the value o f life; and he may deprive a person of
his property before he is aware that his own may be taken from him. The lower orders, when they are first
invested with political fights, stand in relation to those rights in the same position as the child does to the
whole o f nature” (1:256).
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republican majority divest self-determination from individuals or groups in the interest of
the common good? Based on Tocqueville’s notion of, and the moral limits to the
political principle of right, the answer appears to be ‘yes,’ but only in those matters that
are exclusively of public interest, of which, say, prosecuting criminals provides a rare
example; although incarcerating these offenders infringes upon their right to selfdetermination, criminality poses such a public threat that this vested right has lost its
political virtue; thus, criminals divest themselves of political right, such that little exists to
trespass upon when rights are revoked in the name of public good. Still, on Tocqueville’s
view, rights taken must exclude those which are solely private in nature (e.g. religion), at
which point the moral world steps in, instructing just and reasonable limits.50
By enriching these features of morality and politics, the administration of the two
worlds by the sexes helps the public recognize the limits of its power. “The republicans
in the United States,” writes Tocqueville “set a high value on morality, respect religious
belief, and acknowledge the existence of rights” (1:434). Decentralizing the
administration of this authority also challenges notions of centralized majority rule that
are natural to democratic minds. Thus, to whatever extent the natural family cannot
prevent ideas of unlimited power, it mitigates its effects by dividing the execution of that
authority between the sexes. Interestingly, this move in the domestic sphere mirrors the
means taken to limit power politically; rather than diminish rights to protect against
excessive freedoms, Americans have simply distributed their execution across a range of

50 A more vexing example is the absence o f the political rights for women; clearly they have done nothing
to merit the loss o f such rights. How then can Tocqueville justify the strict domesticity they are assigned
by public opinion? One possibility is that female domesticity constitutes the best contribution to political
virtue by the morality that it promotes, which makes domesticity right on Tocqueville’s view.
Additionally, Tocqueville suggests that women are not deprived of political rights because they do not
experience their social position as such (2:223). Nevertheless female domesticity remains a difficult social
construct to square with the positive right to self-determination.
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administrators, each of whom has only enough power to succeed in his public charge, so
that, in Tocqueville’s words, “the community should be at once regulated and free”
(1:73).51
The opposite appears true in Europe where a disregard for gender differences (e.g.
France) is accompanied by the boundless rule of the majority. In Europe, writes
Tocqueville, “legitimate tyranny and holy injustice” are countenanced in the “name of the
people” (1:434). Although it is difficult to trace causality from gender uniformity to
tyranny, the consequences above stem from misapplied habits of mind—dogma to
politics, doubt to morality, respectively—each of which strongly compromises liberty.52
Moreover, these phenomena highlight the importance of customs, mentioned earlier, to
the maintenance of democracy. Not unlike Mexico’s experience with federalism,
Europe’s despotic rendition of republicanism seems due to an absence of the cultural
preconditions needed for success—in this case a public opinion that sharply divides, yet
equally values the two sexes. “While the European endeavors to forget his domestic
troubles by agitating society,” writes Tocqueville, “the American derives from his own
home that love of order which he afterwards carries with him into public affairs” (1:315).
Thus, by dividing the administration of moral and political authority between the sexes,
the American family facilitates the appropriate use of dogma and doubt; this, in turn,

51 A brief, though good example o f administrative decentralization can be found in ‘Powers o f the
Township in New England’ in Democracy, Volume One, Chapter Five (1:64-66).
52 On the latter consequence, Tocqueville writes, “When the religion o f a people is destroyed, doubt gets a
hold of the higher powers o f the intellect and half paralyzes all the others. ... Such a condition cannot but
enervate the soul, relax the springs o f the will and prepare a people for servitude” (2:23). On the former, the
effect is similar: “Some have not feared to assert that a people can never outstep the boundaries o f justice
and reason in those affairs that are peculiarly its own; and that consequently full power may be given to the
majority by which it is represented. But this is the language o f a slave” (1:269).
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supports a public majority that understands its limits to power and avoids the slide from
republicanism into tyranny.
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CHAPTER IV

THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND DEMOCRATIC HABITS OF THE BODY

Before discussing the so-called habits of the body, a brief point on conceptual
definitions may be helpful; the habits addressed here, refer to those behaviors, in tandem
with the notions of physical welfare behind them, which serve the material desires of
democrats under conditions of equality. Viewed as such, these habits overlap, at times,
with dispositions of mind, considered broadly. To untangle democracy’s dangers
however, it is simply helpful to view them through distinct, albeit imperfect categories.
Nevertheless, it may assist readers to understand ‘habits of the body’ mentioned here as
those which concern the body, be they actions taken on its behalf, or notions of how to
meet its needs.
The family’s interaction with these habits comes indirectly, promoting practices
that counteract the dangerous desires of the body without explicitly condemning the taste
for physical welfare. It does so almost exclusively as a venue for religion which, I will
show, is the most compelling, but also problematic medium for this task. Given the
discussion of justice in Chapter II on the needs of different ages, it is not surprising that
attention to the body is a chief feature of democratic society, yet one that may ultimately
precipitate its demise. Tocqueville discusses this predilection under a few names: “The
taste for physical well-being,” “the love of physical gratifications” or “physical
prosperity” and “the passion for physical comforts” all refer to a disposition natural
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among democrats for an attention to the needs of the flesh.53 Attention to physical
welfare, however, is not exclusively democratic; aristocrats appeared, at times, famously
hedonistic. What distinguishes this habit between the ages is its relative ubiquity, the
markedly different form it takes, and most importantly, its consequences.
In aristocracies, Tocqueville observes that a general absence of material well
being among commoners is punctuated by extravagant prosperity among nobility, neither
of whom seem overly concerned with this aspect of their welfare (2:136-37); the latter
simply take for granted the material comforts of their inherited station, while the former,
for reasons similarly owed to class, give up hope of ever living well (2:136-37). The
outcomes of such fixed customs were aristocratic societies that placed little value on
material well-being—a very different, but equally problematic consequence (e.g. squalor)
for much of mankind, than the passion for well-being, under conditions of equality.
In America, where family tradition and heritage have been compromised more so
than in Europe, and where the fortunes of men are in constant flux, equality opens the
road to prosperity tp all. The equal opportunity to procure wealth and the vicissitudes
that men face to maintain it keeps “the love of well-being [as] the predominant taste of
the nation” (2:138). Interestingly, as the importance of well-being is raised, the
enterprises needed to fulfill it diminish. Aristocrats, for example, used lavish excess to
gratify material desires of largely secondary importance, while democrats doggedly
pursue life’s simplest pleasures as if little exists beyond them (2:140). It is this
distinction, both of the relative priority of well-being, and the means used to serve them,
that gives the habits of the body in democracies an especially dangerous cast.

33 When helptul I have tried to distinguish the effects o f the love o f well-being on democracy generally,
from its effect on Americans specifically, as there are, at times, important and marked differences.
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Before discussing these features however, it is important to recognize that
attention to physical well-being, like the mental habits of dogma and doubt, and the
majority opinion thpy support, is not in itself pernicious; Tocqueville finds merit (and
justice) in attending to one’s material needs in pursuit of human improvement. Rather, it
is the manner in which this habit is pursued, the ends which it serves, and, like majority
opinion, the limits that instruct it that determine its consequences, including its relative
danger. In one sense, the Americans’ love of well-being is very positive. Unlike in
aristocracies, men who have not yet achieved material success retain perennial hope for
prosperity, while those who have finally found it never take its permanence for granted.
Under these conditions, opportunities for prosperity foster a common appreciation for
physical well-being among men. If Americans sometimes allow this need too much
sway, they at least never forget its importance.
As we turn to the more dangerous side of the love of well-being in democratic
times, it becomes clear that Tocqueville sees harmful consequences emerging from this
habit, some from the relentless consumption that satisfies it, others from the passion for
material welfare itself. In terms of the former, these means to well-being manifest in
paltry material goals rather than enterprises of extravagance. In America, for example,
men seek to “add a few yards of land.. .plant an orchard.. .enlarge a dwelling” to gratify
their wants (2:140). Given the diminished conception of man under a preponderant
majority, it is little wonder that his ambition favors such modest means over grander,
more daring enterprises. In pursuing such tangible gains, Tocqueville observes,
Americans do not indulge in proscribed addictions but instead follow sanctioned paths to
well-being (2:141).
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The consequences of such habits are very different from the outcome of
aristocratic opulence. Of the latter, debasement was the danger of the day, while in
democratic times a distraction or slackening of the soul presides (2:141). The character
of this danger is not unlike what democrats face from the loss of their revolutionary
mindset through misapplied habits of mind. Recall that Tocqueville mentions revolutions
(of thought as well as politics) not for the chaos with which they threaten democratic
order, but for the apathy that their long-term absence precipitates. Similarly, the comfort
and effortless convenience towards which their pursuit of property aims, distracts
democrats from loftier objectives which, when undertaken, facilitate human improvement
(2:140).54 On these mundane means to well-being, Tocqueville writes “These are small
objects, but the soul clings to them; it dwells upon them closely.. .till they at last shut out
the rest of the world and sometimes intervene between itself and heaven” (2:140). Oddly,
what augments the danger of Americans’ legitimate means to well-being are morality,
order and religion, the very characteristics that protect them against tyranny (2:140). It
follows that, without intending to, the natural family abets this danger by the support it
gives these virtues.
This assistance is owed, in particular, to the new role of women under conditions
of equality. We have seen, for example, how the separation of the sexes in the natural
family creates a tidy division of authority between morals and politics that gives order to
these worlds. Moreover, the regularity that married women bring to the American home
(esp. female sexual morality) creates a domestic base for public tranquility, the first

54 The improving quality o f hardship, as well as its absence from democratic society, is taken up more
vociferously by Freidriqh Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil, a half-century later. See, sections 202, 212,
225 for examples.
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precondition of commercial success. Finally, as “women are the protectors of morals,”
they are also the advocates of Christianity in America, which, on Tocqueville's view,
teaches that the honest acquisition of wealth is not incompatible with salvation (2:27).
Thus, an unintended consequence of the family’s supporting role in democracy is that it
indirectly facilitates well-being through the honest pursuit of property, a tendency that
Tocqueville fears may someday foster an ethos of “virtuous materialism” (2:141). In
such a state, these paltry means of material gratification become, themselves, ends toward
which all human action is directed (2:141). At this point, the democratic love of well
being takes a dangerous turn.
It is worth noting that Tocqueville did not think that Americans had reached this
stage (2:147); while he did observe their distraction from higher aims of the soul, thanks
to their petty means to well-being, no evidence suggests they had had begun to conflate
the means with ends; Americans were not, on his view, materialists. We can credit this
virtue, perhaps, to their robust religious life and strong opinions on family. Before doing
so, however, it is important to examine the danger of true materialism, at which point the
means to well-being do become life’s exclusive ends, fostered by the belief that the soul
of man is nothing. This specter represents the worst possible outcome for democratic
habits of the body and exerts a double danger on society, threatening recognition of the
soul altogether and endangering liberty as well.
Although materialism is largely eschewed by Americans, the danger that it poses
to humanity is so formative and far-reaching that it warrants some of Tocqueville’s
strongest censure in Democracy.55 In nations with strongly religious customs—which are
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predicated, ultimately, on the fate of the human soul—the pursuit of well-being is
restricted to actions which do not contradict the tenets of Christianity; criminal means to
prosperity, for example, are proscribed. Moreover, as long as the soul, however
attenuated, remains fixed in the minds of men, actions taken on the body’s behalf will
never become the ends to life; they may consume men, but the presence of the soul will
keep their thoughts and feelings buoyed upward (2:155). Materialism, however, offers
no such hope. If the objects of well-being in democracy distract the soul from lofty
enterprises, materialism denies the soul its existence altogether. Under such conditions,
the rationale of Christian morality falters, and the habits of the body, already acute under
conditions of equality, become instructed instead by materialism, which “disposes men to
believe that all is matter only” giving them free reign to pursue material welfare without
limitations (2:154).
That true materialism is not evident in America, however, may be qualified by the
presence (albeit infrequent) of religious fanaticism there. On Tocqueville’s view, “the
taste for what is infinite and the love of what is immortal” is a divine fixture of man’s
constitution, and cannot be abrogated by custom (2:142). The chronic subordination of
spiritual needs to the wants of the body fosters a kind of “religious insanity” that crops up
in Americans who deny themselves spiritual fulfillment (2:142).56 Its presence suggests
that while the American nation is not materialist, an ardent love for material well-being
prevails in some alongside the priority that most allow the dictates of religion. Thus, by

55 He writes, for example, “If among the opinions o f democratic people any o f those pernicious theories
exist which tend to inculcate that all perishes with the body, let men by whom such theories are professed
be marked as the natural foes o f the whole people” (2:154).
56 It is noteworthy that Tocqueville observes this phenomenon in the West especially, states which
represent, literally, the leading edge o f Americans’ acquisitive habits.
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Tocqueville’s time, materialism may have already taken root in America, and, while
remaining largely subterranean, the infrequent, but extreme religious passions that he
witnessed may be a premonitory sign of its growing ascendancy.
Just how far down the road to materialism the Americans have traveled is
important to know, not only to assay their spiritual health, but also to forecast the survival
of liberty there. Tocqueville believes that if democratic peoples, in their rush toward
wealth, overlook the free associations that underlie democratic prosperity, their love of
well-being will seek to dominate—rather than take instruction from—their “education
and experience of free institutions” (2:149). Should this occur, he argues, men see (albeit
wrongly) the civic participation required for freedom as irksome and superfluous to their
new priority, the pursuit of property (2:149). Not only does this condition disengage men
politically, it endears them to the first ruler who can ensure tranquility and order (the
preconditions for prpsperity) to whom they exchange their civil liberties for a clearer path
C<7

to wealth (2:149); in democracies, this outcome disposes men to despotism.

CO

Irrespective of the true degree of American materialism, the character of well
being in democratic times suggests that its dangers can be mitigated by giving men loftier
immaterial means to follow their ambition and, more importantly, by keeping the ends of

57 Interestingly, Tocqueville fears materialism for the very reason that Thomas Hobbes praises it in
Leviathan: it disengages men from politics. In Hobbes’s view, the path to public tranquility is paved by
prosperity which he believes is a liberty unavailable in the more brutish state o f nature. Tocqueville, on the
other hand, finds self-determination (though different from that in Hobbes’s primeval state) as the mark of
civilization, while Hobbes suggests that it is an onerous and ideally an unnecessary distraction from private
life. Thus, both men agree on the effects o f materialism (and o f religion, for that matter), even if they give
it a converse place within their political theories.
58 It is important to note that Tocqueville did not think that democratic despotism was the inevitable
outcome o f conditions o f equality despite democrats’ tendency to accept circumstantial fatalism, generally
(2:93). To counter our deterministic beliefs, Tocqueville enjoins us to recognize that a portion o f history is
at all times the product o f human action; therefore our fate is largely within our control. Thus, to avoid the
despotism to which Democracy seeks to alert us, our first task is to believe in our own ability to do so.
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well-being from becoming the ends of life itself, a process that requires, centrally, the
confirmation of the “immortality of the soul” (2:154). To accomplish these goals,
Tocqueville suggests we “diffuse the love of the infinite, lofty aspirations and a love of
pleasures not of this world” (2:154). Religion, the most obvious medium for such a task,
overflows with such qualities but cannot inculcate them by challenging well-being head
on, for the passion is too natural to equality to ever be frilly contained. Rather, it utilizes
the family, which functions both as its surrogate and in its own capacity to check
democracy’s materialistic malaise.
As the family is the chief focus here, a thorough account of how religion mitigates
materialism, save for when it interfaces with family to achieve this result, is beyond the
scope of this work.59 The first such joint-effort regards the challenge that religion faces
simply entering secular society. Tocqueville notes that as equality intensifies, religion
must be sure not to cross the mandates of public opinion (2:28). In this respect, the
traditional architecture of religious edification faces significant barriers; it can no longer
rely on its connection to statesmen for authority, nor can it remain particularly
hierarchical, for democrats eschew complicated forms and pride themselves on the
division of church and state (2:5,26).60 Consequently, Tocqueville remarks “I have seen
no country in which Christianity is clothed with fewer forms, figures or observances than
in the United States, or where it presents distinct, simple and general notions to the mind”

591 would argue, however, that religion, as portrayed in Democracy, is the leading antidote to the dangers
o f the age o f equality; afl others, including family, are secondary. But this is beside the focus o f the paper.
60 Presumably, the overt hierarchy o f Catholicism would be a greater barrier to its influence on the secular
life o f society than the egalitarianism o f Protestantism; however, in terms o f strictly religious appeal,
Tocqueville observes that Catholicism is making great strides in America for its authoritative unity (2:30).
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(2:28). Upon close inspection, however, it appears that Christianity in America hides its
forms and figures in an unsuspecting place: the democratic family.
Tocqueville avers that to make any inroads in democratic times, religion must
disengage from politics, as not doing so would endanger its influence over the minds of
men by redirecting its attention from universal to factional interests, the source of its
demise across Europe (1:325). In America, while religion remains formally separate
from politics, it is hardly divorced from public life;61 it simply makes a quieter, less
obtrusive entrance into public opinion through family, over whose women, if we recall, it
holds particular sway. Through her socially separate, but equally valued role within the
home (as shown in Chapter II) the American wife constitutes an inconspicuous and thus
more acceptable form for the promulgation of religious ideas, including: the soul’s
permanence, a love of infinity, and immaterial pleasures, all of which instruct a measured
approach to material well-being. In fact, the domestic female becomes an ideal courier of
Christian morality in democratic times, for her difference is disarming enough that men
grant her a kind of moral and intellectual influence that they would never allow their
male contemporaries. Standing apart from the formal administration of the church (i.e.
clergy), while still providing cover for religion, women and family accomplish its
mandates nonetheless.
As the American family teaches morality beyond the sermons of church, it begins
to counteract materialism more directly. Like religion however, it does not impugn
attention to physical welfare; instead it heightens attention to the soul and in doing so,
supports the better use of each. Tocqueville implies that successful democracy is

61 Tocqueville goes so far as to call religion “the first o f [America’s] political institutions,” for the use o f
freedom it facilitates there” (2:316).
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predicated on the “doctrine of the immortality of the soul,” yet he avers that politics can
not enlist religion for this task (2:156). Under such conditions, its leaders, Tocqueville
feels, must meet this challenge by “always.. .act[ing] as if they believed in it themselves”
(2:156). If we recall the character of American wives from Chapter II, we see that
fidelity and female courage at home models the kind of temperance and moral fortitude
that Tocqueville asks of legislators in public. Moreover, these characteristics succeed
without denying men (or women) the “legitimate pleasures of the home” (e.g. sex)
without which men develop “a taste for excess” among other disorders (1:315).
Tocqueville expects that by facilitating the use of higher faculties, the soul finds
its rightful place as captain of all human passions, including that for physical welfare;
thus, the needs of the soul and those of the body are not mutually exclusive, but rather
complementary. By giving material desires a more enlightened character, the soul
actually improves the quality of material welfare far beyond the indiscriminate
acquisition that occurs when its needs, under materialism, go unrecognized. “In man,”
writes Tocqueville “the angel teaches the brute the art of satisfying its desires” (2:157).
Here, his example of female courage is particularly apropos. In sacrificing the physical
comforts of village life for the austerity of wilderness living, the American wife draws on
her strength of will not in service of religious idealism, but for the promise of her
family’s future welfare, secured in due course by the prosperity of her pioneer husband
whom she supports with the natural enjoyments of home. By disciplining her desire for
physical comfort, she controls her enjoyment of material welfare with prudence and an
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eye to the future, rather than remaining controlled by her desire for immediate
gratification.
Finally, the family helps check democrats’ material instincts by inculcating a taste
for immaterial pleasures. Here it operates less as a surrogate for religion, though it works
similarly by moving the ends to living beyond the most proximate and tangible of
material goals. Recall that Tocqueville praises the Massachusetts founding for its
families, specifically for the presence of women and children there.

Of the two, women

seem to be of particular value for any number of contributions they make to the growth of
American democracy: their connection to religion, their novel place within public
opinion, the coinage and fortitude they model at home, etc. On the other hand, children
appear complementary to democracy more by their presence than by any direct
contribution they make to liberty. In terms of mitigating materialism, this is particularly
true.
Tocqueville writes that in ages of equality it is important that both political
leaders and philosophers show that life’s best rewards come only after long and
continuous efforts towards distant goals, a belief that religion teaches through the
doctrine of salvation (2:159). At home, parenthood embodies this idea. To parents,
children become (hopefully!) the apotheoses of immaterial rewards whose attainment is
predicated, to varying degrees, on parenting over a lifetime. This is especially true in
ages of equality where the fate of each is less secure than ever before. Under aristocracy,
the invariability of class and lineage rendered quality parenting, presumably, less

62 Alice Behnegar's discussion o f women's acceptance of marital inequality (p.9) is made in similar terms.
63 See page 20.
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relevant, for family name and fortune propped up prodigal sons while even the most wellraised children were circumscribed by station. By contrast, democratic flux makes the
stakes of parenting greater, but the process more rewarding. After all, one of equality’s
virtues is that it strengthens the natural affections between generations and facilitates the
free and regular exchange of ideas (2:206). Thus, if anything inspires lifelong attention
to distant, immaterial goals, it is the hope of seeing one’s children succeed, a prospect
made palpable by parenthood in the American family.
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CHAPTER V

THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND DEMOCRATIC HABITS OF THE HEART

The final category into which democracy’s chief dangers fall, and within which
the family’s influence can be seen, is that of the heart, the most intangible dimension of
man, yet one whose character holds the strongest implications for politics. Here, I would
like to clarify what I call democratic habits of the heart. To this moniker, I ascribe not
only the “outward form of human actions”—what Tocqueville terms manners, but deeper
dispositions of mind and feelings between people, moral and intellectual features of
democracy present in American customs (1:310). For, while the chief habit of the heart
concerns feelings, it is impossible to understand it fully without discussing certain ideas
that shape it, or the concomitant actions that constitute the true character of its danger and
virtue. Nevertheless, as any discussion of the human heart remains challenging for its
conceptual imprecision, I ask for the reader’s patience with my definition of its habits
here.
As Tocqueville suggests that the heart is home to our most human faculties—
namely our morality—it is the complex realm of human associational life over which the
heart most strongly presides. In other words, within the “government of human
societies” or, political life, the habits of the heart are most marked (2:301). Thus, the
interaction of the American family with these habits, in particular, will be most proximate
to its effect on democracy (the essence of my research question) although, as I have
shown, family clearly influences democracy through habits of the mind and body too.
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As we turn to equality’s effect on the heart, Tocqueville notes that the first
observation is a feeling of separateness, which, on reflection, should come as little
surprise (2:304). As class—the tie that in previous ages bound men to each other by duty
and necessity—attenuates, men increasingly embrace their newfound self-sufficiency;
skepticism and the pursuit of material well-being, for example, are also manifestations of
this agency. Tocqueville, however, makes a key distinction between civil and political
autonomy in democratic times that alerts us to the normative limit of democrats’ feelings
of separateness. He writes, “In civil life, every man may, strictly speaking, fancy that he
can provide for his own wants; in political life he can fancy no such thing” (2:123).
Under equality, the average man is better equipped with the intellectual and economic
resources—but not the political means—to provide for himself without the help of others.
Thus, if feelings instruct associations, the bedrock of democratic politics, the heart’s
inclination to separate and pursue private interests has clear political implications for the
age of equality.
While feelings of separation are exclusive to the heart, the mind is similarly
affected, as we have seen, by notions of independence, which give democrats their
skeptical dispositions under conditions of equality (2:104); moreover, like the chief habits
of the mind (dogma and doubt) and the body (the love of material well-being), the heart’s
inclination toward private interests holds both positive and negative potential for
democracy. From this habit, we can trace the closest relationship between the immediate
consequences of private interest and their ultimate fate for society—liberty or despotism.
The factor upon which this outcome turns is where the pursuit of private interest leads
our associations with others.
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The force of private interest in democratic ages should not be underestimated, nor
should the weight of its implications. Tocqueville writes, “It must.. .be expected that
personal interest will become more than ever the principle if not the sole spring of men’s
actions; but it remains to be seen how each man will understand his personal interest”
(2:132). Most importantly, this understanding is crucial for the survival of democracy
which relies on a connection between private interest and public good fitted to the moral
habits of the age. Whereas in past times self-sacrifice was promoted for no other end
than the beauty of its virtue, Tocqueville observes that the same habits today must be
couched in terms that resonate with man’s singular interest in himself, namely the utility
that doing good affords (2:130). In America, he notes, the moralists have successfully
normalized a principle of conduct, “enlightened self-interest” (or, “self-interest wellunderstood”), from this connection (2:130). In doing so, the moral consequences of the
separation man feels are connected to collective welfare so that in working towards the
latter one serves private interest too. Although enlightened self-interest does not
diminish democrats’ enlarged love of self, this disposition is much preferred to a darker,
and perhaps more likely manifestation of private interest in democratic times—
individualism.
Like the prevalence of enlightened self-interest, individualism is also singular to
democracy, but instead of recognizing the connection between personal and common
interest—even if for no other reason than to maximize the former—individualism denies
the utility of shared enterprise by replacing it, instead, with the idea that man is wholly
self-sufficient (2:105). Under individualism, men “are apt to imagine that their whole
destiny is in their own hands,” writes Tocqueville (2:105). This misconception appears
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to stem from the perceived irrelevance of duties as democratic citizens become
increasingly autonomous. By contrast, Tocqueville shows how class and tradition tied
men to one another in all aspects of aristocratic life, when success, however great or
small, was predicated on services offered, or claimed from, others (2:105). By virtue of
the rights and responsibilities—as well as the concomitant dependence—of class and
generational hierarchies, aristocracy’s forms helped disabuse even the noblest aristocrats
of feelings of self-sufficiency; from precisely converse conditions, democratic equality
confirms the very same feelings.
Moreover, even American democracy cannot maintain the same commitment to
duty with replacement forms such as the democratic family (i.e. the family built upon
natural sympathies), as the rise of individualism is too strongly linked to the loss of
tradition, and its medium, paternal authority, for the new moral matriarch to successfully
replicate; important though she is, traditional notions of duty that accompanied paternal
rule escape the moral authority of the American wife, for whom self-sacrifice is realized
by each generation, only to be discovered anew through experience and education—but
not tradition—in the next. This is not to say that duties are not recreated in the American
family, for they are, but simply that duty there can no longer rely on tradition, and must
call on something else—namely, enlightened self-interest—for its legitimacy.64

64 American women’s notions o f propriety and social roles, are based first on the use o f reason and only
secondarily, on tradition or faith (2:211). Given the heightened import o f religion to democracy, we can
understand this ordering thus: If religious traditions (e.g. faith-based notions o f female virtue) are used
inappropriately, they risk endangerment, for the age o f equality engenders such fealty to the powers o f
individual reason, that if reason is not given its due priority when appropriate—which here includes the
basis for female virtue—religious faith appears to trespass upon the domain o f reason. That Americans are
cautious with their use o f religious justifications must impress Tocqueville, for he proclaims that he would
rather the clergy be locked up within the church than have them to step beyond it (2:156)
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Still, it remains to be shown why the consequences of pursuing private interests
are so markedly different between its manifestations as enlightened self-interest and
individualism. Specifically, why should the belief that “[an individual’s] whole destiny is
in their own hands” (2:105) under individualism, be cause for more concern than, say, the
skepticism and pursuit of material welfare that can still flourish alongside enlightened
self-interest? Both conditions admit the enlarged agency of the individual and hold the
advancement of a very narrowly circumscribed circle of interest as their chief goal (if not
their only goal in the former case); is this difference not one of degree more than kind?
In fact, this may be so. Enlightened self-interest is still se/^interest and thus not wholly
dissimilar to individualism in its focus on the individual. The key distinction, and what
makes the latter so mortal to democracy and the former so apropos, is the divergent
associational habits that stem from these rather nuanced understandings of private
interest.
Like enlightened self-interest, which starts as a calculus for increasing personal
gain but becomes an acquired taste for cooperation, individualism also begins in the mind
with the perceived irrelevance of duties, but quickly transforms into feelings of radical
separation from others, beginning with the farthest reaches of associational life—public
cooperation—and erodes inward until man is “confine[d]...entirely within the solitude of
his own heart” (2:104,106). Through misconceptions of duty (namely, that none exist),
which exaggerate democrats’ natural feelings of separation, individualism eventually
leaves no room for shared experience between men. In doing so, not only does it steal
from democrats the utility of associating for political purposes—the first cooperative
effort to fall under individualism—it also robs from democracy its chance to fulfill the
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normative mandate of politics: the improvement of man, as Tocqueville understands it,
and by extension, its justice.65 He writes, “Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart
is enlarged and the human mind is developed only by the reciprocal influence of men
upon one another... .This can only be accomplished by associations.” (2:117). Thus, as
compared to the less acute feelings of exclusion behind enlightened self-interest,
individualism is distinctly pernicious for the social isolationism it creates, the very
opposite moral habit of what is needed to achieve human growth and sustain democratic
liberty.
With the leading manifestations of private interest defined, and the stakes of these
different interpretations clarified, our attention can turn from the danger of individualism
to the likelihood that Americans will meet this fate. In doing so, we can see with greater
clarity the family’s influence on the habits of the heart. As mentioned, both the mass
appeal of enlightened self-interest (though not the phenomenon itself) and feelings of
individualism are unique to conditions of equality. Individualism’s ascent, however,
appears more effortless, for its prevalence within the human heart lies in direct
relationship to conditions of equality among society (2:104); the feeling appears to flow
naturally from a state of day to day independence from others, specifically, the
observation that duties appear no longer necessary for self-preservation (2:105). On the
other hand, the connection of common to private interest—the basis of enlightened selfinterest—is less obvious to democrats because it involves effects often beyond their
immediate vicinity; moreover, their skeptical natures obscure from them truths they
cannot readily touch. According to Tocqueville, the key to inculcating a taste for

65 Recall the discussion o f Tocqueville’s conception o f justice at the end o f Chapter II.
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cooperation—and thereby avoiding individualism—is educating men in the value of
pursuing shared interests, for which the American family, as I will show, functions as an
important medium (2:132).66
Teaching Americans the principle of enlightened self-interest occurs in the family
in the same manner with which the Americans learn the value of politics—through
personal experience. Specifically, this education comes from the duties that accompany
their distinct gender roles. Women, for example, learn this principle from the response of
public opinion which requires them to give up the pleasures and freedoms they enjoyed
as girls for the good of their family as wives, namely its need for domestic and moral
regularity. By sacrificing desires exclusive to their own well-being, American wives find
a path to “domestic happiness” and social confirmation alongside the order they enjoy
with their family, all products of the sacrifice of private interests (2:212-13).67
American men’s understanding of enlightened self-interest comes from the duties
they perform as democratic fathers and husbands. As we have seen in Chapter II, the
father’s role, including both his rights and responsibilities, has changed significantly
since aristocratic times, when he was “the author and the support of his family but also its
constituted ruler” (2:204). In democratic times, the former role remains, but in limited

66 Education plays an important part in the success o f American democracy and recurs throughout the
topics addressed by Tocqueville in Democracy. In addition to the relevance o f American girls’ experiential
education, for which, in part, the success o f American marriage is owed, education was extremely
important to the country’s founding; the prevalence and aim o f education among the Puritans testifies to
this fact. Citing an early mandate for the basis o f education, Tocqueville quotes, “Whereas Satan, the
enemy o f mankind, finds his strongest weapons in the ignorance o f mankind, and whereas it is important
that the wisdom o f our fathers shall not remain buried in their tombs, and whereas the education o f the
children is one o f the prime concerns o f the state....” (1:43). Later, Tocqueville claims that in America “the
end and aim o f education” is politics (1:330). Given this evidence, the importance o f education in
normalizing the principle o f enlightened self-interest—a doctrine aimed to inculcate moral behavior—
should come as no surprise.
67 See pages four and five o f Chapter I for a discussion o f women’s use o f enlightened self-interest in the
literature.
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duration, while the latter atrophies entirely. The tasks that attend this change are labor in
service to domestic prosperity, while his family is young, and the counsel of his
experience as his children age and become their parents’ equals; moreover, each of his
duties to family improves the American father’s own chance of commercial success. By
giving his labor to advance the material welfare of his family, and his time and attention
to older children when they seek his advice, fathers do their part to a secure a home life
that is both materially secure and ordered with respect and admiration, if not fear and
authority. As Tocqueville has shown, such a state is a chief precondition for commercial
success, which brings to mind the importance of female morality, but which should not
overlook the role of dutiful fathers in this process. Indeed, little endangers business more
than the greedy and agitated state of society that prevails without, or with disordered,
families.

/• O

Thus, Americans of both sexes first learn of the connection between private

and common interest (albeit in a limited capacity) from the responsibilities they take on
in family. These duties are instructed by the natural differences distinguishing the sexes,
and serve common ends (i.e. family goods) close enough to home for spouses to grasp
their connection to private interest (2:223).
Despite the moral education gleaned from duties to family, the Americans’
institution, as an association, may seem tenuously indicative of the cooperative habits
that Tocqueville claims flow exclusively from enlightened self-interest;69 after all, one of
the first consequences of individualism is an emotional entrenchment in which democrats

68 On Tocqueville’s view, the European family provides the appropriate (though converse) example o f the
connection between domestic order and public tranquility. He writes, “While the European endeavors to
forget his domestic troubles by agitating society, the American derives from his own home that love of
order which he afterwards carries with him into public affairs” (1:315).
69 That is, the fact that the Americans work cooperatively as a family seems weakly linked to the same habit
in public life.
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settle into exclusive spheres of friends and family (2:104); moreover, America appears to
abound in these cliques. Yet, it would be wrong to infer the prevalence of individualism
there solely upon this evidence. On the contrary, the private circles in which Americans
find themselves signify a more benign, and on Tocqueville’s view natural source—robust
public associations (2:227). What may seem counterintuitive comes from the following
observation: as Americans increasingly engage each other as social equals, fewer and
fewer forms exist with which to distinguish individual men. For this purpose, private life
takes on the function that class held in aristocracies and an abundance of cliques arise to
distinguish friends from simple compatriots (2:227). Thus, the presence of exclusive
circles in which Americans focus their private interests is not indicative of individualism
there, for on Tocqueville’s own rationale this would have to be preceded by the
disengagement from public life that accompanies this process, a feature of society
contrary to the Americans’ experience.

70

What Tocqueville finds in terms of Americans’ associational life is every
indication that they have imbibed the principle of enlightened self-interest and applied it
to both their public and political endeavors. It is difficult to know the order or the
primacy of these two venues of association, for each exerts a reciprocal effect on the
other (2:123). However, it is clear that they are a product of the same revelation, and one
that betrays Americans’ long experience with democracy, namely, the understanding that
the independence that equality begets is accompanied by individual weakness in a society

70 It is worth mentioning Tocqueville’s often challenging use o f “private," “public” and “political." While I
hesitate to claim a complete understanding o f these different terms, it appears that he gives “public” a place
distinct from “political." This may confuse contemporary readers who may view them as synonymous, or
nearly so. However, as Tocqueville opens Chapter V o f Book II in Volume II, he takes pains to
distinguish between public and political associations, the former being those exclusive to life beyond
private coteries but also outside o f cooperation for political ends. Moral, religious and philanthropic
associations all occupy this category (2:114).
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with few established forms protecting private persons (2:185).71 In an effort to protect
their cherished self-sufficiency, the Americans have adopted the principle of enlightened
self-interest in response to their time spent living as equals which “[has taught] them that
although they do not habitually require the assistance of others, a time almost always
comes when they cannot do without it” (2:185).
In public affairs, Americans associate for almost every purpose as they can see,
by the aforementioned truth, the importance of strength in numbers. However, such
endeavors are naturally challenging to maintain for the very same reason: a multitude
must work in concert because each is so individually powerless (2:116). On this point,
political associations appear superior, for they quickly present a shared goal upon which
many agree, and by associating in such large numbers, democrats more fully grasp the
power of cooperation (2:124); yet despite the edificatory power of political associations,
their public counterparts appear even more fundamental, for as Tocqueville notes,
citizens can live well privately without associating for political purposes, but “civilization
itself would be endangered” if men never acquired the habit in their day to day lives
(2:115); in contemporary terms, the former associations ensure America’s democratic
state while the latter protects its nation.
The Americans exemplify Tocqueville’s belief that if democrats can be convinced
that cooperation is in their own best interest, they will soon learn, upon testing this
theory, the full extent to which it is true. Moreover, by normalizing the principle of
enlightened self-interest, they have outwitted their own self-serving natures, for through
this process, calculated self-interest becomes instinctive sympathy, the acknowledgment

71 In aristocracies, o f course, these protections came in the form o f classes, and the duties incumbent upon
them.
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of a shared fate, and ultimately, recognition of duties between equals who need each
other to maintain their freedom (2:112). Most importantly, this recognition precludes
individualism by correcting the fallacy that equality renders democrats fully self•
• •
72
sufficient and thereby deprives despotism of its surest means—human dissociation.
To

the extent that the democratic family supports this understanding, the association merits
its greatest praise, even if a full appreciation of enlightened self-interest is reserved for
public life and politics.
Concluding Thoughts

As we take a final look at the family’s influence on democracy, its virtues become
clear in light of Tocqueville’s greatest fear—the ascendancy of democratic despotism. In
one respect, this final crisis highlights America’s first confrontation between the order
and morality of New England families and the materialism of Virginia’s mercenaries:
Like the legacy of the Virginia founding, the despotism that democracies may one day
face evinces little evidence of family and none of the influence of women. Save for the
mention of children—which in this case represent the limit of sympathy under
widespread individualism—we have no indication that women exist, much less that they
have left their mark on society.
There is no sign of female temperance, or the pursuit—through parenthood—of
immaterial success among a multitude who ceaselessly endeavor to “glut” themselves on
“the petty and paltry pleasure of life” (2:336). The enlightened self-interest that women
model as courageous wives and selfless mothers is likewise absent a populous who exists
in and for themselves alone (2:336). The morality with which democratic women inform

72 A fuller account o f democratic despotism comes in the section that follows.
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skepticism, temper materialism and preempt individualism—endeavors that help protect
republican government—is nowhere to be seen in this despotic, “tutelary power” (3:336).
Worst of all, the strength of will that women develop as girls, model as wives, and
ultimately teach to men, is replaced by the worst possible civic disposition—apathy,
which is indulged by a society that, in Tocqueville’s words “would be like the authority if
a parent if, like that authority, its object was to prepare men for manhood; but it seeks, on
the contrary, to keep them in perpetual childhood” (2:336).
Under democratic despotism, the family’s natural sympathies and moral influence
are replaced by the nanny state, whose imperious coddling “circumscribes the will within
a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself’ (2:337), most
importantly, his ability to remain free. When considered in this light, the contribution of
American families to avoiding such conditions is remarkable. Despotism, Tocqueville
claims, is not congenital to democracies, but rather it comes with age; and while
Tocqueville is clear that this fate is not assured, it must remain a “salutary fear” (2:348)
in the minds of all who wish to preserve liberty in democratic times.
If we look closely, we find that the family’s virtue to democratic freedom lies in
the acknowledgment of natural and complementary differences between the sexes—
differences that in America bring equal respect to the sexes. Yet the differences
acknowledged in the family are unlike those of aristocratic classes, both in their genesis
(natural in the former case, conventional in the latter) and in their remedial effect on
democracy, for Tocqueville says, “the object is not to retain peculiar advantages that the
inequality of conditions bestows upon mankind, but to secure the new benefits which
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equality may supply” (2:352). On this point, the democratic family, a product of the
novel state of equality, is one such asset.
I would be remiss, however, if I allowed the family in Democracy too much
explanatory power without raising potential qualifications. One such point regards my
presentation of women and Christianity; while Tocqueville is clear that female morality
surpasses that of men’s, I may have overextended the idea that morality—in particular
sexual morality—defines Christianity so much so that American women become the
greatest representations of religion. While women do model certain tenets of Christianity
in a way that, I believe, is not captured by the sermons of American clergy (i.e. by living
Christian mores) whether such action represents Christianity, or simply the morality often
associated with it, is an important question. Here, of course, what constitutes Christianity
is key, and presents a sharper point for reflection: Is Tocqueville’s emphasis on Christian
morality (as opposed to divine grace) the best measure of the religion generally, or
simply characteristic of the 19th Century Christianity he witnessed in New England.73
Admittedly, my ability to settle this issue is lacking, nevertheless the question may be
better addressed by historians and theologians than by those who study politics, for
Tocqueville’s real concern with religion in Democracy regards its utility more so than its
essence. Thus, whatever the answer, Democracy’s American women play a key role
promoting the morals that Tocqueville finds essential to the maintenance of democratic
liberty.

73 There is, however, evidence that Tocqueville did not view morality in America as strictly utilitarian (i.e.
simply a means to salvation) even though his treatment o f religion and morals in Democracy suggests
otherwise. He recognized that men often engage in moral action to celebrate the glory o f God, not only to
gain His grace (2:133-4). See Volume II, Book II, Chapter IX (That the Americans Apply the Principle of
Self-Interest Rightly Understood to Religious Matters) for Tocqueville’s nuanced understanding o f
Christian morality.
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Looking beyond the text, I believe the greatest lesson we can take from
Tocqueville’s democratic family is the value that difference holds under sweeping
conditions of equality. Specifically, it is the sameness of “men, all equal and alike”
(2:336) that both failed America’s young democracy at Jamestown and with which it
threatens to destroy it, in maturity, under democratic despotism. Thus, the retention of
difference merits our attention not to satisfy our recent penchant for diversity, but
because the dangers endemic to democracy are ameliorated by the influence that people
can have on each other when appropriate difference is retained. Simply put, without the
duties that difference helps foster, extreme equality (i.e. sameness) leads us towards the
dangers of which Tocqueville speaks: dogmatic skepticism, materialism, dissociation,
and perhaps ultimately, democratic despotism.
At the same time, we must sanction our differences wisely, for artificial difference
today can dehumanize man below the human relations of antiquity. Most recently, a dark
chapter of modem American history was opened, and summarily closed, on the very idea
of ‘separate but equal’. However, unlike the natural difference that Tocqueville praises
in American marriage, segregation—and before it, slavery—took its dividing lines from
differences that man, not God, ascribed to him self. Based on the tragic outcomes of
these institutions, the justice of difference in democracies depends on what we choose to
recognize and whether this, consequentially, improves the human condition.74
Yet despite a long history of trying to balance equality with difference, Americans
still appear incapable of addressing this difficulty; our aversion to affirmative action, for
example, makes this quite clear. Indeed, simply raising the issue of difference today can

74 This same measure of justice, Tocqueville believes, at least gives the context for our struggle with
difference—the age o f equality—a greatness o f its own (2:351).
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become scandalous, as Harvard University’s Lawrence Summers, discovered firsthand.75
As we work within the often challenging parameters of difference today, we should
reflect often on Tocqueville’s own thoughts on the matter. He writes:
“Men place the greatness of their idea of unity in the means, God in the
ends; hence this idea of greatness, as men conceive it, leads us to infinite
littleness. To compel all men to follow the same course toward the same
object is a human conception; to introduce infinite variety of action, but so
combined that all these acts lead in a thousand different ways to the
accomplishment of one great design, is divine conception” (2:386).
In the case of family, the Americans of Tocqueville’s time seem to have properly
understood this principle and used it well against equality’s greatest dangers; whether we
will do so in our own day, remains another question.

75 Summers resigned as Harvard’s 27th President after asking whether innate differences between the sexes
could explain women's mixed success in math and science fields ignited a firestorm of controversy at the
university.
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APPENDIX: CHIEF HABITS AND THEIR POTENTIAL OUTCOMES

1) Mind:

C J o p a i i l Doubt
" .

^

'

C^Tjranny of the M ajoritT^}

2) Body:

Love of Physical Well-Being

Materialism

3) Heart:

Enlightened Self-Interest

In d iv id u a lism
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